# ORDER & DISORDER

- Link: https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/
- Published: 2023-10-11T20:41:37-04:00

## Views of US Foreign Policy in a Fragmented World

_A report originally published under IGA’s former name, the Eurasia Group Foundation_

By [Mark H](https://egfound.org/about/team/mark-hannah/)[annah](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/about/team/mark-hannah/),
[Lucas Robinson](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/about/team/mark-hannah/),
and [Zur](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/about/team/zuri-linetsky/)[i Linetsky](https://egfound.org/about/team/zuri-linetsky/)

October 2023

[View Report as PDF](http://egfound.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/2023-Order-Disorder.pdf)

View more reports: [2018](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2018/11/worlds-apart/)
| [2019](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2019/09/indispensable-no-more/) |
[2020](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2020/11/diplomacy-and-restraint/) |
[2021](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2021/09/inflection-point/) | [2022](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2022/10/rethinking-american-strength/)
| [2023](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/)
| [2024](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2024/09/vox-populi-battlegrounds/)

### In The News

[[ [](https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2023-12-03/joe-biden-israel-hamas-gaza-ukraine-russia) [](https
://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/27/united-states-middle-east-wars-asia-europe-same-time/) [](https
://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3238666/secessionists-independence-call-demagogy-not-democracy) [](https
://www.gzeromedia.com/what-kind-of-foreign-policy-do-americans-want) [](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/american-public-opinion-on-ukraine/) [](https
://www.barrons.com/news/most-americans-would-back-military-intervention-for-taiwan-survey-12c8d98a)

## **Contents**

[Executive Summary](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#executive-summary)
| [Introduction](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#introduction)
| [Who Took Our Survey?](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#who-took-our-survey)
| [Specific Findings](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#specific-findings)
| [Adversaries and Challenges](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#adversaries-challenges)
| [Views of US Alliances](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#alliances)
| [US Role in the World](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#role-in-world)
| [Policy Issues](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#policy-issues)
| [Methodology & Limitations](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#methodology)

## **Executive Summary**

As the 2024 presidential election nears, the Biden administration’s foreign policy
choices and major global challenges — from the Russia-Ukraine war to China’s growing
influence in Asia and beyond — will be increasingly scrutinized through a partisan
lens. The Institute for Global Affairs (formerly the Eurasia Group Foundation) conducted
its sixth annual survey of Americans’ foreign policy views with this in mind. We
surveyed a nationally representative sample of one thousand voting-age Americans
about their views of America’s role in a turbulent world. 

**Americans generally support the Biden administration’s major foreign policy decisions**

 * More people think the United States responded well to Russia’s war in Ukraine
   than did not — 43 percent vs. 26 percent. About a third hold a neutral opinion;
 * Two years after the president withdrew troops from Afghanistan, most people think
   the war will be remembered as a failed mission from the start (30%) or something
   which should have ended when Osama bin Laden was killed (32%);
 * Most Americans (77%) support pursuing nuclear negotiations with Iran;

**But on certain critical foreign policy topics, public support for US policy is
tepid**

 * As the Biden administration casts its support for Ukraine as an enduring commitment
   in defense of democracy itself, more Americans think the primary goal of the 
   United States should be to avoid escalation or prevent Ukrainians’ suffering 
   than defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity or democracy;
 * A majority of Americans (58%) think the United States should push for a negotiated
   settlement in the war in Ukraine, with many citing the war’s high cost in human
   lives;
 * More than twice as many people want the defense budget to decrease (34%) as support
   an increase (16%) — though half would maintain military spending at current levels;

**Americans’ foreign policy views are marked by stark partisan divisions, and — 
in a challenge to President Biden as he courts swing voters — Independents align
more with Republicans in crucial areas **

 * The national security topics which most influence how Democrats vote are human
   rights and climate change. The topics which most influence Republicans are immigration
   and defense policy. The topics which most influence Independents are immigration
   and human rights; 
 * Republicans and Independents are more likely to want to decrease than increase
   US engagement in collective security organizations such as the UN or NATO (33%
   to 23%, and 37% to 32% respectively). Democrats are four times as likely to want
   to increase as decrease such engagement (37% to 9%);
 * Almost twice as many Democrats support America’s response to the Russia-Ukraine
   war as Republicans and Independents;
 * Significantly more Democrats than Republican and Independents selected nuclear
   war with a great power like Russia among the top three threats facing the United
   States — 40 percent vs. 35 percent and 33 percent;
 * Democrats are much more supportive of Ukraine’s NATO ambitions than Republicans
   and Independents — 84 percent vs. 64 percent and 62 percent;
 * Republicans and Independents are about twice as likely as Democrats to list a
   potential war with a competitor like China among the top three threats facing
   the United States — 37 percent and 34 percent vs. 18 percent. It is ranked in
   the top two threats among Republicans and bottom two among Democrats;
 * Democrats, Republicans, and Independents all tilt toward intervention in a hypothetical
   Chinese invasion of Taiwan — but Republicans are forty percent more likely than
   Democrats or Independents to “strongly support” a military operation;
 * Democrats differ from Republicans and Independents on the main goal of US foreign
   policy. Whereas a plurality of Democrats (38%) think America should promote democracy,
   pluralities of Republicans (43%) and Independents (37%) think the main goal is
   to protect against foreign threats;
 * On the issues of military spending and arms sales, however, Independents are 
   more aligned with Democrats. Twice as many Independents and Democrats support
   a decrease in the defense budget as an increase. Republicans are about evenly
   split. Majorities of Democrats and Independents — but not Republicans — want 
   to stop selling weapons abroad;

**There are also several differences in foreign policy views between racial and 
age groups**

 * The most important national security issues for Americans ages 18 to 29 are human
   rights and climate change. For older Americans, they are immigration and defense
   policy;
 * Nearly half (45%) of Americans ages 18 to 29 believe the possession of nuclear
   weapons is immoral — a view which becomes less common with age.
 * Fifty-eight percent of Black and 62 percent of Hispanic Americans think the United
   States should stop selling arms globally. White Americans, however, are split—
   49 percent think the United States should stop.

**Most Americans are committed to alliances, but many want European allies to do
more and the United States less**

 * When asked their views of NATO and America’s troop presence in Europe, Democrats
   primarily focus on the benefits — while Republicans and Independents focus on
   the burdens — of collective security; 
 * Sixty-two percent of Americans think the United States should send troops to 
   defend a NATO ally under attack, with a plurality (45%) citing the importance
   of America’s treaty obligations;
 * Even so, more than six times as many Americans want the United States to decrease(
   32%) or withdraw (17%) its troops from Europe as want it to increase (8%) its
   troop presence to better defend European allies. Nearly twice as many want to
   reduce (19%) or mostly withdraw (12%) US military presence in Asia as want to
   increase it (16%);
 * Roughly as many think adding more democracies to NATO protects US interests (
   37%) as are primarily concerned about NATO’s European members taking more responsibility
   for their own security (38%).

**[Back to Table of Contents](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#contents)**

## **Introduction**

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reminded the world of the harsh realities of geopolitics.
When the Cold War ended, many observers believed — or at least hoped — great power
rivalry was a thing of the past. America and its wealthy, democratic allies stood
at the vanguard of a harmonious future where international politics were to be governed
by the liberal norms of a rules-based order.^([1](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#1))

Free from the need to tread carefully in a world of Soviet counterbalancing, the
United States tried to enforce such an order, launching military operations in Somalia,
Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq during the first Gulf War. After 9/11, policymakers would
come to believe that stomping out Islamic fundamentalism and autocratic aggression
was key to realizing the democratic ambitions of _Pax Americana_. Yet quick victories
in Afghanistan and Iraq proved illusory. The United States found its troops committed
to bloody, open-ended occupations of countries which struggled to engineer stable
democracies.

By the time Russia invaded Ukraine in February of 2022, the heady idealism of the
immediate post-Cold War era — the triumphal 1990s — might have subsided, but the
prospect of a major land war in Europe still surprised many.^([2](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#2))

The Biden administration has tried to portray an international community united 
in opposition to — and outrage at — Russia’s invasion. However, the international
reaction to the invasion has not been so unanimous. More than a third of Asian countries
and nearly half of African countries failed to condemn Russia in a preliminary vote
at the United Nations. _The New York Times_ reports, “Russia has been able to take
advantage of trade relationships and friendly public opinion dating to the Cold 
War” and that there’s a “growing reluctance in many nations to accept an American
narrative of right and wrong.”^([3](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#3))

Major democracies such as India continue to purchase Russian energy supplies, and
European allies like Hungary and Turkey have exploited their diplomatic ties with
Russia to improve their geopolitical position.^([4](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#4))
American partners in the Persian Gulf voted to condemn Russia but have become more
neutral, with Dubai becoming a hotbed of Russian oligarchs seeking to evade Western
sanctions.^([5](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#5))
The president of Brazil, the Western Hemisphere’s second largest democracy, insists“
the reason for the war between Russia and Ukraine needs to be clearer.”^([6](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#6))
If the war in Ukraine is part of a global struggle between democracy and autocracy,
as the Biden administration claims, other democracies have not necessarily gotten
the memo. 

> **_As countries compete more intensely in the international arena, political parties_
> _offer competing visions of US foreign policy at home. This is particularly_ _challenging
> for President Biden, whose foreign policy credentials were forged_ _in a very 
> different political and geopolitical environment._**

The fact US allies hedge when confronted with great power rivalry was evident in
the survey of people in three Asian countries we published in the spring. “Caught
in the Middle: Views of US-China Competition Across Asia” tracked public perceptions
of the United States, China, and US-China competition in the Philippines, South 
Korea, and Singapore. Although survey takers held the United States in high esteem,
they also held some positive views of China, and worried about US-China rivalry.
^([7](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#7))

As the 2024 presidential campaign looms, Americans’ views on their country’s global
role — and their perceptions of adversaries and threats — are refracted through 
the lens of partisan politics. The war in Ukraine divides the Republican primary
hopefuls.^([8](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#8))
Nikki Haley and Mike Pence criticize the Biden administration for not providing 
military aid to Ukraine fast enough while Vivek Ramaswamy casts the conflict as,“
just a battle between two thugs on the other side of Eastern Europe.”^([9](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#9))

The following pages reveal a Republican party which is less committed to maintaining
a troop presence in Europe and shouldering the burdens of European security, while
more supportive of a ramped up presence in Asia and willing to intervene militarily
against China in a hypothetical attack on Taiwan. Democrats are less worried than
Republicans about a possible war with China and more hawkish toward Russia. While
Independents hew more closely to Republicans on their regional priorities, their
concern about immigration, and their belief that the primary goal of US foreign 
policy should be to protect America from foreign threats, they align more with Democrats
when it comes to significant support for decreasing military spending and ending
foreign arms sales, and concern about climate change. 

In short, as countries have begun to compete more intensely in the international
arena, political parties have begun to offer competing visions of US foreign policy
at home. This is particularly challenging for an incumbent presidential candidate
whose impressive foreign policy credentials were forged in a very different geopolitical
environment — a unipolar era in which US power was unrivaled — and a very different
political environment — one in which bipartisan unity was characterized in the now-
outmoded maxim that politics “stop at the water’s edge.” 

As the upcoming presidential election gains momentum, foreign policy topics will
be hotly contested — immigration, the legacy of the war in Afghanistan and President
Biden’s withdrawal, the continued use of drones in combating global terrorism, climate
change, and global health crises will all influence the decisions of American voters.
As we have found in previous years, our survey findings suggest Americans don’t 
share the expansive view of America’s international role which is so often articulated
by the country’s foreign policy leadership.^([10](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#10))
While the public supports many types of diplomatic engagement (including with America’s
adversaries), there is little appetite for armed interventions, a belief that international
organizations should take the lead in responding to attacks on vulnerable populations,
and a desire to reduce US troop levels in Europe.

Though American voters tend to prioritize domestic political issues, we at the Institute
for Global Affairs (IGA) think geopolitics and foreign policy influence Americans’
lives in important, though often underappreciated, ways. As a public education organization,
we seek to make complex foreign policy topics more approachable, and encourage the
country’s foreign policy leaders to take the public’s foreign policy preferences
seriously. Much has been made about the disconnect between Washington policymaking
and ordinary voters’ preferences.^([11](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#11))
When the public thinks its opinions are unheeded, the conditions for widespread 
conspiratorial thinking are created — a la the “deep state.” But this dilemma isn’t
a one-way street. When voters fail to make their preferences known, leaders have
less incentive — and ability — to engage them. Foreign policy is not merely the 
remit of experts. In a democracy like ours, it ought to be the subject of careful
public scrutiny and lively public debate. We hope this report will, in even a modest
way, contribute to that scrutiny and enable that debate.

**[Back to Table of Contents](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#contents)**

## Who Took Our Survey?

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/0_Who-took-
our-survey.png)

**[Back to Table of Contents](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#contents)**

**[Adversaries and Challenges](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#adversaries-challenges)
| [Views of US Alliances](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#alliances)
| [US Role in the World](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#role-in-world)
| [Policy Issues](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#policy-issues)**

# **Specific Findings**

# Adversaries and Challenges

## **Russia-Ukraine War: The Atlantic Challenge**

Much of the attention on the Biden administration’s foreign policy has been focused
on America’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. On this topic, the president
receives relatively high marks from the public. More Americans believe the United
States responded well to the war than believe it did not. 

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/1a-01.png)

President Biden assures Ukraine that America’s assistance will continue for “as 
long as it takes.”^([12](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#12))
But as the war grinds on with an estimated half a million people killed or injured,
and amid news reports of limited gains in Kyiv’s costly counteroffensive, some have
expressed weariness.^([13](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#13))

Assessments of America’s response vary along partisan lines in particular. Most 
Democrats have a favorable view of Washington’s response, whereas Republicans and
Independents are split. This may be driven by — or might be driving — their party’s
elected officials becoming increasingly divided in their support for US assistance.

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/1b.png)

Most Americans who think the United States responded well point to Washington’s 
willingness to strengthen Ukraine with military aid. This is not surprising, given
Ukraine’s impressive resistance efforts and the tone of national press coverage 
of America’s support for Ukraine.^([14](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#14))
But some support the prudent aspects of the Biden administration’s response. As 
Washington has sought to empower European allies to take more responsibility for
security on their continent, nearly a quarter of respondents think the United States
responded well primarily because it strengthened Europe’s ability to defend itself.
A smaller but still significant number were mainly impressed by the administration’s
avoidance of conflict with Russia. 

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/1c.png)

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/1d.png)

Americans who don’t think Washington responded well tend to think the United States
is doing too much rather than not enough. Nearly half want European allies to take
on more responsibility, and nearly a third worry US support is depleting America’s
ammunition stockpiles. Relatively few think sanctions should be tougher, US troops
should be deployed to Ukraine, or more advanced weapons should be delivered to Ukraine.

Many Democrats, Republicans, and Independents disapprove of America’s response primarily
because they think Europe should do more to support Ukraine and the United States
less — 54 percent, 42 percent, and 51 percent, respectively. They echo concerns 
raised by some security analysts that the provision of weapons and ammunition has
strained America’s military-industrial capacity. Indeed, 36 percent of Republicans
and 31 percent of Independents, but only 17 percent of Democrats are principally
worried that aid to Ukraine will deplete America’s ammunition stockpiles.^([15](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#15))

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/1e.png)

Although most Americans (57%) _are not_ concerned about the state of America’s ammunition
stockpile, there is partisan disagreement on this issue. A majority of Republicans
and about half of Independents are worried, while almost three-quarters of Democrats
are not. For nearly a quarter of Republicans (23%), America’s limited supply of 
munitions is a top reason for the United States to push for a negotiated settlement
to end the war.

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/1f-Conflicted-
copy-from-EURASIANYMB124-on-2023-10-02.png)

The effectiveness of Ukraine’s initial defense against Russia’s invasion surprised
many Western observers. Russian forces quickly adapted and are now shielded in occupied
territory by layers of fortification.^([16](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#16))
The Ukrainian military has made a few bursts of limited progress which don’t seem
to alter the strategic environment.^([17](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#17))
It’s unclear how this conflict will end. With no military solution in sight, outgoing
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark A. Milley, predicted it “probably
will end somewhere, somehow, at a negotiating table.”^([18](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#18))

Diplomacy between Ukraine and Russia has so far floundered. Russia recently dismissed
a Ukrainian peace plan.^([19](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#19))
And outside powers — such as Italy and China — have, to no avail, pushed peace proposals
in the last year to nudge the warring parties toward a negotiated settlement.^([20](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#20))
The United States, for its part, has so far refrained from pressuring Ukraine to
conduct peace talks with its invader. As one senior official put it, it’s up to 
Ukraine “to determine how victory is decided and when and on what terms.”^([21](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#21))

Most Americans, however, think the United States should push for a negotiated settlement.
Across the political spectrum, the most frequent reason given is the high human 
cost of war.^([22](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#22))
This is followed by the belief that neither Russia nor Ukraine will be able to win
an all-out victory. Among the 42 percent who think the United States should not 
push for a negotiated settlement, the most frequently selected reason is that Washington
should defer to Ukraine out of respect for the fact this war is theirs.

Washington’s level of motivation to bring the warring parties to the negotiating
table is informed by America’s goals in the conflict. While President Biden has 
consistently asserted American support is critical for defending Ukraine’s democracy
and sovereignty, other officials have suggested the United States wants to “see 
Russia weakened.”^([23](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#23))

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/x-Conflicted-
copy-from-EURASIANYMB124-on-2023-10-03.png)

Survey takers were asked to select the two most important goals of America’s support
for Ukraine. A plurality think the United States should prioritize avoiding a direct
war with Russia, and a third or more selected preventing Ukrainian suffering, defending
democratic countries from authoritarian governments, or preserving Ukraine’s sovereignty.
The least frequently selected goal was weakening Russia to punish it.

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/1a-02.png)

Americans’ beliefs about the goals the United States should pursue in Ukraine vary
by party affiliation. Whereas more than half of Republicans and Independents listed
avoiding a US-Russia conflagration as one of their top two goals, Democrats are 
more evenly divided. Among Democratic survey takers, defending democratic countries,
preserving Ukrainian sovereignty, and avoiding a direct war with Russia were each
selected around 40 percent of the time.

## China’s Rise: The Pacific Challenge

The Biden administration labels China’s effort to assert itself America’s “most 
serious long-term challenge.”^([24](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#24))
The president has sought to strengthen the country’s alliances and partnerships 
in the Indo-Pacific. Among other initiatives, the administration formed a trilateral
security pact with the United Kingdom and Australia, expanded its access to military
bases in the Philippines, and is in talks with Vietnam to broker what could be the
largest arms deal ever between these two countries.^([25](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#25))

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/1g-1.png)

As the United States projects power in Asia, America’s efforts to defend its allies
and maintain a “free and open” Indo-Pacific depends, in part, on the ability to 
access military bases in geostrategically important areas.^([26](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#26))
A slim majority of Americans think the current level of access for the US military
is sufficient to defend America’s allies. And nearly one in three Americans either
say they’d like to see the United States reduce the number of bases it currently
uses in Asia or withdraw most of its military presence in the region.

As geopolitical tensions between the United States and China rise, so too does the
risk of war between these two powers. Of all flashpoints, the Taiwan Strait is perhaps
the most likely to lead to armed conflict. Since the end of the Chinese Civil War,
when the nationalists fled to this island formerly known as Formosa, Beijing has
considered Taiwan a breakaway province. In the past few years, American military
officials have speculated about when Beijing may decide to “reunify” China through
force.^([27](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#27))
America’s policy towards Taiwan — which, despite America’s provision of arms to 
the island nation, remains deliberately ambiguous on whether Washington would come
to Taiwan’s defense — is a point of political contention in Washington.^([28](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#28))

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/1h.png)

Despite the likely high cost and casualties, a slight majority of Americans would
support, to varying degrees, US military intervention on behalf of Taipei in a war
with China. Roughly 60 percent support militarily defending Taiwan, while 40 percent
oppose intervention.

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/1i.png)

There are partisan differences in how the threat of a war with China is perceived.
Although support for defending Taiwan in a war with China holds across the political
spectrum, Republicans are 40 percent more likely than Democrats or Independents 
to “strongly support” a military operation._ _

Overall, fewer than a third of Americans (29%) list “conventional war with a competitor
like China” as one of the three greatest threats which confront the nation. War 
with China is ranked significantly lower than natural disasters stemming from climate
change (42%), “nuclear war with a great power like Russia” (37%), and growing distrust
toward democratic institutions (37%). It is about on par with the threat of an economically
damaging trade war (28%).

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/1j.png)

More than a third of Republicans rank the potential for war with China as one of
the top three threats facing the United States. Immigration ranked as the top threat
for Republicans, and the prospect of war with China tied with concern for Americans’
growing distrust of democratic institutions. Independents ranked the potential for
war with China behind climate change-induced natural disasters and distrust of democratic
institutions. 

Fewer than a fifth of Democrats deemed war with China a top threat. Democrats most
frequently selected natural disasters, Americans’ growing distrust of democratic
institutions, and nuclear war.

**[Back to Specific Findings](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#specific-findings)**

# Views of US Alliances

In his September remarks at the 78th session of the United Nations General Assembly,
President Biden acknowledged the future of the United States is bound to that of
all other nations: “No nation can meet the challenges of today alone.”^([29](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#29))

President Biden sought to shore up ebbing international support for the Ukrainian
war effort.^([30](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#30))
The United States, in Biden’s formulation, needs its allies and partners to support
Ukraine’s defense of its sovereign territory. In a stark departure from the Trump
administration, President Biden has focused on cementing and broadening America’s
alliance commitments globally. The administration prioritizes alliances and partnerships
in both its National Security Strategy and its National Defense Strategy.^([31](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#31))
This effort is evident in America’s renewed commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). 

For years before Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, foreign policy analysts and NATO
country leaders questioned the strategic logic of NATO in a post-Cold War era. French
President Emmanuel Macron claimed European nations were witnessing the “brain death”
of the alliance.^([32](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#32))
Russia’s invasion, however, revitalized NATO’s sense of purpose.

The Russian invasion shocked Finland and Sweden to drop their long-maintained neutrality
and apply for alliance membership. Finland became NATO’s 31st member in April 2023.
Sweden, whose membership has faced objections from Hungary and Turkey, has yet to
be accepted into the consensus-based organization.

As security analysts debate the wisdom of NATO expansion, our survey finds the American
public supportive of NATO membership for Finland (83%) and Sweden (84%).^([33](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#33))

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/2a.png)

Support for Ukraine’s membership bid is less widespread. Corruption and conflicts
with Russia have dogged Kyiv’s membership aspirations since 2008 — when NATO first
discussed the possibility of Ukraine and Georgia joining. For some, the Russia-Ukraine
war makes it urgent that Ukraine quickly joins NATO to deter further attacks.^([34](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#34))
For others, the potential cost to alliance credibility and more probable threat 
of conflict with Russia make Ukraine’s membership strategically unsound.^([35](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#35))

When not given a “neutral” or “don’t know” option, most Americans assent to NATO
membership for Ukraine, but support is more mixed for Kyiv than it is for either
Helsinki or Stockholm. Support for Ukraine’s membership is highest among Democrats—
roughly 84 percent support Ukraine joining the alliance — and less pronounced among
Republicans (64%) and Independents (62%).

Among Americans who support Ukraine’s membership in NATO, the two most frequently
selected reasons are: it will help deter Russia from attacking Ukraine again (37%)
and Ukraine’s capabilities and experience fighting the Russians will strengthen 
the alliance (24%). Fewer Americans think Ukraine should be a NATO member due to
the high cost it has paid fighting Russia (20%) or because of its strategic geographic
location (19%).

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/2b.png)

Opposition to Ukraine’s membership is driven by a concern that persistent territorial
disputes between Russia and Ukraine will spark another regional conflict in the 
future (28%) and fears that America will be treaty-bound to go to war with Russia
over Ukraine (24%). Other Americans think membership will make the current war worse(
22%) and that Ukraine doesn’t meet NATO’s governance standards (21%). Only 5 percent
believe Ukraine doesn’t need membership because it has proven that it can defend
itself.

Among Democrats and Republicans, rationales for opposition vary. A plurality of 
Democrats note the potential for future territorial conflicts, while a plurality
of Republicans point to Ukraine’s failure to meet NATO standards for governance 
or democracy.

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/2c-02.png)

When reminded of NATO’s Article V treaty obligation — to respond to the invasion
of an ally as an invasion of itself — and asked to imagine a hypothetical Russian
invasion of Finland, the majority think the United States ought to defend Finland
militarily regardless of party affiliation. Republicans and Independents, however,
are significantly less willing than Democrats to put US troops in harm’s way to 
defend this European ally. 

We have asked a version of this question about Article V treaty obligations for 
the past six years on this survey. Past years have used Estonia as the Eastern European
ally in the case of a hypothetical Russian invasion. Historically, respondents have
been roughly split on the question, with only the slimmest of majorities tilting
toward intervention.^([36](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#36))
Perhaps influenced by news of Russia’s aggression or positive attention to Finland’s
new membership, respondents this year were the most pro-intervention on this question,
with 62 percent supporting a military response and 38 percent opposing. This is 
a significant level of support, but likely not significant enough to give allies
confidence an American defense of their territory would be strengthened by broad
popular support.

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/2d.png)

A plurality of people who support defending Finland think if the United States fails
to meet its treaty obligations, it will lose the trust of its allies. Similarly,
about one in three supporters think that not defending Finland would create an incentive
for Russia to attempt an invasion of another European country. The most cited reason
for opposing a military defense of Finland is the prospect of catastrophic escalation
in a war with Russia. 

Democrats are equally worried about Russia invading another European country and
allies not trusting US commitments (46% each). A plurality of Republicans (40%) 
and Independents (48%) are concerned about trust in US alliance commitments, while
nearly one in three Republicans (34%) and Independents (32%) worry Russia would 
invade another European country. 

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/2e.png)

Across the political spectrum, Americans think Russia sees NATO expansion as a threat
to its security. This does little to temper their willingness to expand the alliance
to include two new members and even entertain the prospect of adding Ukraine.

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/2f-02.png)

When Americans were asked to select a statement which best summarized their opinion
of NATO, a plurality emphasized a desire for European countries to take more responsibility
for Europe’s security (38%). The second most frequent statement focused on how more
advanced democracies in the alliance protect the United States (37%). The latter
view is most popular among Democrats while the former view is most popular among
Republicans and Independents. In other words, Democrats seem to focus on the benefits—
while Republicans and Independents focus on the burdens — of collective security.

The answers less frequently selected by the American public were: Europe fairly 
shares the Alliance’s defense burden (21%), American resources could be better spent
elsewhere (22%), NATO protects the United States from a direct conflict with Russia(
20%), and that NATO expansion increases US-Russia tensions (20%).

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/2g.png)

Americans’ desire to shift the burden of European security to European allies is
evident in their views on US troops stationed across the continent. Fewer than one
in ten Americans think the United States should increase the number of troops it
stations in Europe. A plurality of Americans prefer to maintain the current number
of troops stationed in Europe to defend countries from attacks and deter threats.
However, roughly half of the American public believes the United States should decrease(
31%) or withdraw most (17%) of its troops. 

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/2h.png)

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/2i.png)

Overall, a plurality of Americans (42%) want the United States to maintain its level
of engagement in international organizations on issues of collective security, less
than third (31%) think the United States should engage more, and roughly a quarter(
27%) think Washington to engage less.

More Independents and Republicans want to decrease than increase the level of US
engagement in collective security organizations. Democrats are four times as likely
to want to _increase_ US engagement in these organizations as decrease. Yet, Independents
are not monolithic – about a third want to _increase_ US engagement in international
organizations. Among the three main political groups, Republicans are least likely
to think the United States should increase its level of engagement in collective
security organizations.

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/2j.png)

**[Back to Specific Findings](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#specific-findings)**

# US Role in the World

The US role in the world has changed significantly in the three decades since the
end of the Cold War.^([37](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#37))
The 2008 financial crisis, intractable insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
the rise of China have, to varying degrees, shaken America’s confidence. The instability
wrought by the invasion of Iraq gave rise to the even more terrifying Islamic State
terror group and precipitated a fresh round of intervention.^([38](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#38))
Humanitarian debacles in Libya and Syria dashed optimism that American power could
reliably be applied to prevent mass atrocities.^([39](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#39))

Despite their differences, Donald Trump and Joe Biden both saw fit to cut America’s
losses in Afghanistan, and conceded that even the awesome strength of the US military
could not overpower the forces of nationalism and religious zeal. 

In this context, it is reasonable to expect that Americans’ faith in the notion 
of American exceptionalism might be waning. Perhaps Americans have been chastened
by the preceding decades of foreign interventionism and rising domestic strife.

Yet, we found most Americans continue to believe America is an exceptional nation,
with less than a quarter disagreeing. Perhaps reflecting upon two decades of disillusionment,
most say America is exceptional for what it represents over what it has done for
the world. The ideals that the United States exemplifies continue to matter to Americans,
reflecting the Biden administration’s often-invoked phrase about the power of America’s
example.^([40](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#40))

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3a.png)

More older Americans believe in the idea that the United States is uniquely virtuous
than do younger Americans. More than three in four people ages 45-64 and 65 or older
think the United States is exceptional for what it represents (62% and 64%, respectively)
or has done for the world (19% and 22%, respectively). Less than a quarter of Americans
in these age groups (19% and 14%) think the United States is unexceptional. Less
than half of Americans ages 18-29 (46%) and 30-44 (49%) believe the United States
is exceptional because of what it represents, and only a quarter say it’s exceptional
because of its global role (26% and 23%, respectively). More than a quarter of people
ages 18-29 and 30-44 (both 28%) think the United States is not unlike any other 
nation.

American exceptionalism is a belief held across the political spectrum, but more
likely to be held by Republicans than any other political affiliation. Roughly 90
percent of Republicans think the United States is exceptional for what it has done
for the world (24%) or what it represents (66%). Only 10 percent believe their country
is not exceptional. By contrast, three-quarters of Democrats and Independents think
the United States is exceptional for what it has done (24% and 23%) or represents(
both 54%), and almost a quarter believe the country is unexceptional (22% and 23%,
respectively).

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3b.png)

There is little consensus about what United States foreign policy should primarily
try to achieve. About one in three (34%) believe the primary purpose of US foreign
policy is to protect the United States from foreign threats. Roughly the same share(
33%) think US foreign policy should primarily focus on promoting democracy, human
rights, and the rule of law around the world. Another third believes it should ensure
American prosperity (23%) or preserve constitutional liberties at home (10%).  

Whereas a plurality of Democrats think the primary goal of US foreign policy is 
to promote democracy globally, a plurality of Republicans and Independents think
the main objective is to protect the country from foreign threats.

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3c.png)

Black and Hispanic Americans differ from White Americans on the core objective of
US foreign policy. White Americans most frequently say US foreign policy should 
focus on protecting the United States from foreign threats. Pluralities of Black
and Hispanic Americans say its primary goal should be promoting democracy.  

Though foreign policy and national security may not receive the most attention during
election season, international issues from migration and trade to climate change
and global pandemics have domestic repercussions. Presidents Donald Trump and Joe
Biden have attempted to clarify this link — be it Trump’s vision of an America First
foreign policy or Biden’s “foreign policy for the middle class.” 

Still, even with these similar-sounding frameworks, the administrations of these
presidents reveal that national elections can lead to both continuity and change
in US foreign policy. For instance, both have named China America’s greatest challenge.
But, whereas Trump criticizes international organizations and globalism, Biden stresses
the importance of institutions and underscores the urgency of addressing global 
challenges.

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3d-V2.png)

When asked to select the three national security issues that most influence their
support for political candidates, the responses most frequently chosen by Americans
as a whole were human rights (44%), climate change (37%), and immigration (37%).
For Republicans, immigration is the national security issue that most often influences
who they support. Defense policy registers as the second most important consideration,
and human trafficking and human rights tie for third. Independents align closely
with those of Republicans, except they rank climate change higher. Democrats rate
human rights, followed by climate change and democracy promotion, as the most influential
issues.

## **There are also important racial and age differences:**

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3e-V2.png)

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3f.png)

While many choose human rights as a critical national security issue informing their
support for political candidates, a plurality of Americans think international organizations,
rather than countries such as the United States, should take the lead in responding
to human rights abuses abroad.

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3g.png)

Democrats stand out because about one in five (19%) say the United States should
use its military to stop human rights abuses around the globe, compared to 11 percent
of Republicans and 6 percent of Independents. By contrast, around half of Republicans
and Independents think the United States should stay out of other countries’ affairs
unless vital national interests are at stake (36% and 33%, respectively) or because
the United States has its own domestic human rights issues (16% and 18%, respectively).

Less than half of Democrats think the United States should reserve its strength 
for vital national security issues (20%) or prioritize domestic issues (19%). Still,
across partisan lines, a plurality of Democrats (42%), Republicans (37%), and Independents(
43%) think international organizations, not the United States, should take the lead
in responding to human rights abuses.  

Across age groups, more than a third of people ages 18-29 (35%), 30-44 (40%), 45-
64 (44%), and 65 and older (40%) think responding to humanitarian crises is the 
primary responsibility of international organizations. Support for US-led humanitarian
intervention decreases with age. One-fifth (23%) of Americans ages 18-29 say the
United States should use its military forces, and only 15 percent of 30-44-year-
olds, 9 percent of 45-64 year-olds and people 65 or older say the same.

Among the youngest age group, 18-29-year-olds, less than half think the United States
should hold its forces in reserve (19%) or prioritize domestic issues (22%). By 
contrast, over half of Americans 65 or older think the United States should use 
its troops sparingly (38%) or prioritize domestic issues (13%). Among Americans 
ages 30-44 and 45-64, slightly less than half think the United States should be 
restrained in its use of force (20% and 33%, respectively) or address issues closer
to home (25% and 14%, respectively).

There are also notable differences among Hispanic, White, and Black Americans in
how they view America’s international responsibilities. Hispanic Americans (21%)
are more likely than White (12%) and Black (10%) Americans to believe the US should
use its military force to stop human rights abuses around the globe. Still, a plurality
of Hispanic Americans (40%), as well as White (42%) and Black Americans (31%) would
prefer to have international organizations take the lead. (Six percent of Black 
Americans registered an opinion of “Not sure.”)

To a greater extent than Black (25%) and Hispanic Americans (19%), White Americans(
30%) think American forces should only be put in harm’s way if there is a threat
to American security. By contrast, more Black Americans (25%) than White (16%) and
Hispanic Americans (19%) think America has its own issues to address, such as mass
incarceration and aggressive policing. 

America’s role in the world may be reflected in its defense budget and extensive
arms transfers to governments and militaries abroad. For instance, commentators 
have evoked memories of Washington’s provision of lend-lease to the allies in World
War II by characterizing America’s supply of weapons and equipment to Ukraine as
the “arsenal of democracy.”^([41](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#41))

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3h.png)

While the US Congress authorizes a near-automatic increase in the national defense
budget annually, half of Americans (50%) think the United States should maintain
its current level of defense spending. And about one-third of Americans (34%) think
defense spending should decrease. Only 16 percent believe the United States should
increase its defense spending.

Age correlates with views of the defense budget. Support for reduced spending is
most pronounced among Americans ages 18-29 (43%) and decreases by age group: 39 
percent of 30-44 year-olds, 32 percent of 45-65 year-olds, and 23 percent of those
65 and older. By contrast, support for maintaining military spending increases with
age: 41 percent of 18-29 year-olds, 48 percent of 30-44 year-olds, 51 percent of
45-64 year-olds, and 58 percent of those 65 or older think the United States should
maintain current levels of spending.

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3i.png)

Nationwide, the top three reasons provided by Americans for increased spending are
to respond to unforeseen challenges (44%), deter aggression from competitors like
Russia (39%), and more effectively compete with China (34%). 

Among the quarter of Republicans who think the defense budget should increase, competing
with China, deterring aggression from competitors like Russia, and unforeseen challenges
are the top three reasons. For Democrats, increased military spending is cited as
necessary to handle unforeseen challenges, deliver emergency aid to countries affected
by natural disasters, and support the US economy. Independents believe more military
spending is needed for unexpected challenges, deterrence, and competition with China.

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3j.png)

Among Americans who think the United States should decrease defense spending, 70
percent say more focus should be on domestic issues, 57 percent believe current 
levels are fiscally irresponsible, and 44 percent say the Department of Defense 
is incapable of managing such a large budget. The Department of Defense has been
unable to account for over half of its budget in several recent audits.^([42](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#42))
This may account for why people selected the latter answer option. And just 6 percent
say America’s natural barriers are protective enough. 

Among the quarter of Republicans who think the United States should decrease spending,
over half selected fiscal irresponsibility. The response chosen most by Democrats
and Independents is that the Pentagon’s budget should be redirected toward domestic
priorities. 

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3k.png)

In addition to outspending all other countries on defense, the United States is 
the largest purveyor of arms globally.^([43](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#43))
Most Democrat and Independent respondents want the United States to stop selling
arms globally, while a slim majority of Republicans think sales should continue.

There are stark divisions by race and age regarding the United States selling arms
internationally. Fifty-nine percent of Black Americans and 62 percent of Hispanic
Americans think the United States should stop global arms sales. White Americans,
by contrast, are split on the issue — 51 percent think the United States should 
continue to sell arms. 

While more than half of people between the ages of 30-44 (59%) and 45-64 (55%) think
the United States should stop selling arms internationally, over half of people 
18-29 and 65 or older (both 47%) think the United States should continue. It’s perhaps
counterintuitive that most young people support international arms sales, and yet
a plurality wants to decrease defense spending, and they prioritize issues such 
as human rights, climate change, and human trafficking — all issues affected by 
American arms sales, directly or indirectly. 

Nationwide, more than half of survey respondents (53%) do not think the United States
should continue to sell arms globally, whereas 47 percent think the United States
should continue selling arms globally.

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3l.png)

Among Americans who think the United States should sell arms globally, more than
a third believe arms sales support democratic allies, and a quarter or more think
they help the economy and build alliances. Very few Americans think arms sales are
critical for competing with China. 

These findings may capture American support for the vast array of arms the United
States has provided to Ukraine through commercial sales, foreign military sales,
and a range of other methods for transferring arms to another country.^([44](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#44))
And it reflects why many Americans think the United States responded to Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine well: it strengthened Ukraine with military aid and contributed
to Ukraine’s impressive resistance efforts.

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/3m.png)

For Americans who think the United States should not sell arms globally, a plurality
say it’s primarily because US arms are used to oppress and kill civilians in global
conflicts. That America’s transfer of weapons may only benefit defense contractors,
support undemocratic regimes, and be an ill-advised means to build alliances were
each selected by less than a quarter of Americans.

**[Back to Specific Findings](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#specific-findings)**

# **Policy Issues**

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and tensions with China have dominated the past year’s
foreign policy headlines. But other issues, including nuclear proliferation, negotiating
with adversaries, the utility of sanctions as a foreign policy tool, and issues 
regarding presidential war powers also demand the Biden administration’s attention.

Adroit diplomacy with allies as well as adversaries is critical for securing US 
interests. Most Americans (67%) — regardless of political leaning — support negotiations
with adversaries, even if they are human rights abusers, dictators, or home to terrorist
organizations. 

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/4a.png)

One of the more controversial instances of diplomacy with an American adversary 
is the ongoing effort to revitalize the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action, from which the United States withdrew during the Trump administration.
President Biden promised a swift return to the agreement, but negotiations have 
been slow-moving.^([45](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#45))
Iran continues to support proxy militias across the Middle East and is engaged in
a brutal crackdown on civil disobedience in the wake of the murder of Mahsa Amini
by morality police.^([46](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#46))

While many Republican lawmakers are outspoken critics of engagement with Iran, there
is bipartisan support for diplomacy.^([47](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#47))
More than three in four Americans indicated support for negotiations with Iran to
prevent it from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Eighty-eight percent of Democrats support
negotiations with Iran, as do 76 percent of Republicans and 73 percent of Independents.

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/4b.png)

The prospect of an Iranian bomb, which some anticipate could trigger nuclear proliferation
in the Middle East, is not the only nuclear challenge faced by the United States
and the international community.^([48](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#48))
America’s withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal is one of several arms control treaties
which have been abandoned in recent decades, from America’s termination of the 1973
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to Russia’s suspension of New START.^([49](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#49))
And major nuclear weapon states like China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea continue
to expand their nuclear arsenals unimpeded.^([50](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#50))

Overall, Americans are concerned with nuclear weapons. When asked to select the 
two responses which best reflect their opinions, nearly half said they are worried
about the spread of nuclear weapons to rogue states and non-state actors. Forty 
percent said tensions between nuclear armed states could lead to the unintentional
or purposeful use of these weapons.

Approximately half of all Democrats (49%), Republicans (48%), and Independents (
50%) are concerned that nuclear weapons might end up in the hands of terrorists 
or rogue states. And more than a third of Democrats (41%), Republicans (34%), and
Independents (35%) think tensions between nuclear-armed powers may lead to their
purposeful or accidental use. 

However, partisan differences emerge when it comes to the utility and morality of
these weapons. Whereas a third of Republicans think nuclear weapons provide the 
United States leverage (35%), less than a quarter of Democrats (19%) and Independents(
23%) do. More Republicans (23%) than Democrats (14%) and Independents (17%) also
think these weapons have made the world safer. Nearly half (42%) of Democrats think
nuclear weapons are immoral, while less than a quarter (24%) of Republicans and 
one-third (35%) of Independents do. Less than a quarter of Democrats (14%), Republicans(
19%), and Independents (18%) believe leaders are too rational to use these weapons.

Forty-five percent of respondents under the age of 30 believe the possession of 
nuclear weapons is immoral. Nearly half also believe tensions between nuclear armed
states may lead to nuclear weapon use (42%). In contrast, over half of those ages
45-64 (53%) and 65 and older (56%) say they are primarily concerned nuclear weapons
may fall into the possession of rogue states or non-state actors, a sentiment held
by 36 percent of Americans ages 18-29. A plurality of people 45-64 (38%) and over
a third of people age 65 and older (36%) say they worry that tensions between nuclear
arms states may lead to nuclear weapon use. 

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/4c.png)

One controversial tool of foreign policy used widely by successive American presidents
is economic sanctions.^([51](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#51))
The controversy revolves around how they are applied. In some cases, sanctions have
been applied narrowly, in others too broadly, and in more recent cases, like Russia,
the regime has been able to work around them.^([52](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#52))

Nearly two-thirds of Americans think sanctions are often (50%) or always (11%) an
effective tool of foreign policy. More than a third think sanctions are rarely (
35%) or never (4%) effective. Democrats are more likely (75%) than Republicans (
63%) and Independents (51%) to think sanctions are always or often effective foreign
policy tools. Independents are the most divided about their impacts; nearly as many
say sanctions work often (43%) as those who say sanctions work rarely (49%). 

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/4d.png)

Drones are another controversial foreign policy tool, which have become a ubiquitous
symbol of America’s war on terror. Employed by the military and Central Intelligence
Agency, they promise policymakers a more precise and less costly way of war. However,
recent high-profile reports have shed light on the true extent of civilian damage
caused by these weapons systems.^([53](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#53))

Despite the controversy which surrounds America’s drone program, over a third say
drones are effective counter-terrorism tools and are less costly than the deployment
of ground troops to combat. The loss of civilian lives as a result of potentially
indiscriminate drone strikes is not a primary concern for most Americans. A majority
of Republicans believe drones are an effective tool (52%) for depriving terrorists
of safe havens or that they are less costly alternatives to ground troops (37%).
Slightly more Democrats say drones are a cheaper alternative to using ground troops(
38%) than say they are an effective tool for combating terrorists (32%). Equal proportions
of Independents (34% and 35%, respectively) selected these response options. 

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/4e.png)

Concern with civilian deaths resulting from drone strikes diminishes as age increases.
Nearly a third (29%) between the ages of 18 and 29 say drone strikes kill many innocent
civilians, whereas about one quarter of people between the ages of 30 and 44 (24%),
and about one in 10 people 45-64 (11%) and 65 and older (10%) say the same. 

In cases of direct conflicts, prior to conducting military operations the President
often requires an Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF). Today, the
2001 AUMF, which passed after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, authorizing
the United States to invade Afghanistan, and the 2002 AUMF, which sanctioned the
2003 invasion of Iraq, remain active law. For over two decades they have provided
the legal basis for US drone strikes and other US military activity against groups
the United States labels as terrorists. 

There is growing bipartisan support in Congress to repeal both of these authorizations.
^([54](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#54))
A bipartisan group of Senators and Representatives contend these authorizations 
minimize the constitutional role of Congress to provide oversight of national security
policy. They argue these laws are loosely interpreted by presidents to use military
force in situations unrelated to the conflicts for which they were passed.^([55](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#55))
In contrast, supporters argue these AUMFs give presidents the ability to quickly
respond to threats overseas.^([56](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#56))

When asked if they think the 2001 AUMF should be repealed, 54 percent say yes and
46 percent say no.

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/4f.png)

The passage of the 2001 AUMF authorized the deployment of US troops to Afghanistan.
The mission, at first, seemed straightforward: dismantle the Taliban government 
and the sanctuary it provided for Al Qaeda terrorists to attack the United States.
But America’s mission expanded. For the next 20 years, the United States — at the
cost of $2 trillion and the lives of over 2,000 American military personnel — strove
unsuccessfully to engineer and support a stable Afghan government.^([57](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#57))

Following through on a deal the Trump administration brokered with the Taliban, 
the Biden administration withdrew US troops. The implementation of America’s withdrawal,
which precipitated the collapse of the Afghan government was, at the time, criticized
by the media.^([58](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#58))
But, now two years later, work is underway to study the lessons learned from two-
decades of war in Afghanistan.^([59](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#59))

![](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/4g.png)

Most Americans think the war in Afghanistan was a failure. A plurality say the war
should have ended when Osama bin Laden was killed (32%). About one third (30%) say
the war in Afghanistan had a failed mission from the start because the US military
should not be in the business of nation building. Twenty-five percent say the United
States should not have abandoned a country it fought hard to make stable and safe
for women and girls. And about 13 percent say the withdrawal hurt America’s credibility.

Biden’s political opponents quickly exploited the chaos of the withdrawal to attack
his foreign policy _bona fides_ early in his administration.^([60](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#60))
While nearly half of Democrats think the war should have ended after Osama bin Laden
was killed, Republican responses are more divided. A plurality think the United 
States should not have abandoned the country, but more than a quarter say it should
have ended after the United States killed Osama bin Laden. Meanwhile, nearly half
of Independents think the war in Afghanistan was a failed mission from the start.

**[Back to Specific Findings](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#specific-findings)**

# **Methodology**

This survey was developed and commissioned by IGA. The survey instrument was written
by Zuri Linetsky and Lucas Robinson with the support and supervision of Mark Hannah.
The survey was distributed online by YouGov, an international research and data 
analytics group, to a nationally representative sample of 1,000 adults in the United
States between August 28 and September 6, 2023. 

To obtain the sample, YouGov used a sample matching approach to recruit respondents
and generate a representative sample of the American population. 

YouGov sample is generated through an opt-in survey panel, composed of approximately
1 million US residents who agreed to participate in YouGov’s Web surveys. Panel 
members are recruited using multiple methods to help ensure diversity in the panel
population. Recruiting methods include Web advertising campaigns (public surveys),
permission-based email campaigns, partner-sponsored solicitations, SMS-to-Web recruitment(
voter registration-based sampling). YouGov invites panel members by email and/or
SMS, depending on how the panelist has opted to be contacted. All invited respondents
opted-in to receive survey invitations from YouGov. 

To recruit a representative sample, YouGov recruited panelists to this survey by
their previously provided answers to YouGov profile questions. At the recruitment
stage respondents were invited based on their fit to interlocking variables of (
gender x race x age x education). To match survey participants to the YouGov population
frame, more interviews than needed are collected. The final sample of respondents
to this survey were matched to a more complete population frame, selecting the closest
matches to the population. Completed interviews were weighted to the sampling frame
using propensity scores. Population weights were normalized to equal sample size.

Response categories for all non-demographic multiple choice questions were randomized.
All analysis was conducted using Excel and YouGov’s proprietary Crunch software.
Zuri Linetsky and Lucas Robinson were responsible for data analysis. 

Whenever reference is made in this report to a “significant” or “statistically significant”
relationship, significance is established beyond the 0.05 level. Graphics included
in the report are summary statistics or cross-tabulations (all cross-tabulation 
included in this report are statistically significant at the 0.05 level). We welcome
questions about the details of our analysis from other researchers.^([61](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#61))

# **Limitations**

Since this survey relies on data collected online there are several limitations.
First, this survey may be affected by sampling bias. There is limited data available
on how or why respondents join these panels. Since this is an online survey, all
respondents must be adept at using internet enabled devices like tablets, smart 
phones, or computers. People lacking these skills and these devices cannot participate
in this survey, and therefore their views are not captured. 

Various forms of response bias may affect the data used in this analysis as well.
Negative views of US policy decisions under the Biden administration may be driven,
at least in part, by some form of social desirability bias, a desire to answer questions
in a way that is socially or morally correct. The threat of this type of bias can
be mitigated by the fact that these surveys are taken on individuals’ phones, tablets,
and computers, and responses are not public. And the survey collected no identifying
information, so respondents could feel more confident their responses would not 
be traced back to them. 

Acquiescence and neutrality bias may affect this survey as well. Since this is an
online survey that relies on some Likert scale questions, respondents may choose
the most positive or the most neutral answer to each question. For acquiescence 
bias, respondents may think, since this survey is focused on Biden presidency policy
choices, that the researchers want to elicit positive views of the Biden administration.
For neutral bias, culture and question type may affect respondents’ choices. Some
people may not be comfortable expressing strong opinions, or the questions as written
may not represent the full range of potential responses. Regardless, to mitigate
both of these forms of bias the survey instrument was kept as short as possible,
and the order of responses were randomized so people could not simply pick an extremely
positive or neutral response option based on looking at a scale. Neutrality and 
acquiescence bias were mitigated by displaying neutral and don’t know options only
if respondents attempted to skip a question. 

**[Back to Table of Contents](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#contents)**

## **About IGA**

IGA pursues industry-leading research on geopolitics and global affairs, creates
relevant, objective, fact-based content, tools, and programming, and partners around
the world to drive awareness, increase understanding, and support action.

**Mark Hannah **is a senior fellow at IGA, where he leads the Independent America
program. He is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a political
partner at the Truman National Security Project. He studied at the University of
Pennsylvania (B.A.), Columbia University (M.Sc.), and the University of Southern
California (Ph.D.).

**Lucas Robinson** is a senior research associate and digital media manager at IGA.
He studied history at the University of California, Los Angeles (B.A.) and theory
and history of international relations at the London School of Economics (M.Sc.).

**Zuri Linetsky** is a research fellow at IGA. He has worked extensively throughout
the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa as an international development practitioner.
He holds a Ph.D. in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia. 

**[Back to Table of Contents](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#contents)**

# **Endnotes**

`[1](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-1).
Francis Fukuyama, _The End of History and the Last Man _(Harper Perennial, 1993).

[2](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-2).
For an exception, see John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe
after the Cold War,” _International Security _15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 5–56. Retrieved
from: [https://doi.org/10.2307/2538981](https://doi.org/10.2307/2538981); John J.
Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault,”_ Foreign Affairs_, August
18, 2014. Retrieved from: [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault).

[3](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-3).
Josh Holder, Lauren Leatherby, Anton Troianovski, Weiyi Cai, “The West Tried to 
Isolate Russia. It Didn’t Work,” _The New York Times_, February 23, 2023. Retrieved
from: [https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/02/23/world/russia-ukraine-geopolitics.html](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/02/23/world/russia-ukraine-geopolitics.html).

[4](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-4-5-6).
Nidhi Verma, “India’s Russian Oil Buying Scales New Highs in May,” Reuters, June
21, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/indias-russian-oil-buying-scales-new-highs-may-trade-2023-06-21/](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/indias-russian-oil-buying-scales-new-highs-may-trade-2023-06-21/);
Mark Hannah, “The Real Reason Ukraine Isn’t Ready to Join NATO,” _Politico Magazine_,
September 18, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/09/18/nato-democracy-00116350](https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/09/18/nato-democracy-00116350).

[5](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-4-5-6).
Jon Gambrell, “Dubai Boom Sees Russian Cash, High Rents and Reborn Projects,” AP
News, February 13, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://apnews.com/article/us-department-of-the-treasury-business-united-arab-emirates-dubai-middle-east-192fbc4638f38d9334ad2508cae1eef4](https://apnews.com/article/us-department-of-the-treasury-business-united-arab-emirates-dubai-middle-east-192fbc4638f38d9334ad2508cae1eef4).

[6](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-4-5-6).
Tartini Parti and Samantha Pearson, “Biden and da Silva Aim to Rekindle US-Brazil
Relations,” _The Wall Street Journal_, February 10, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-and-da-silva-aim-to-rekindle-u-s-brazil-relations-3213cc23](https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-and-da-silva-aim-to-rekindle-u-s-brazil-relations-3213cc23).

[7](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-7).
Caroline Gray, Zuri Linetsky, Lucas Robinson, and Mark Hannah, “Caught in the Middle:
Views of US-China Competition Across Asia,” Eurasia Group Foundation, June 2023.
Retrieved from: [https://egfound.org/2023/06/modeling-democracy-caught-in-the-middle/#full-report](https://egfound.org/2023/06/modeling-democracy-caught-in-the-middle/#full-report)

[8](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-8-9).
Gavin Bade, “Candidates Show Deep Divide Over War in Ukraine,” _Politico_, August
23, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://www.politico.com/news/2023/08/23/republican-debate-ukraine-divide-00112659](https://www.politico.com/news/2023/08/23/republican-debate-ukraine-divide-00112659).

[9](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-8-9).
Ishaan Tharoor, “On Ukraine, Republicans Grapple with Real Political Divisions,”
_The Washington Post_, August 23, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/23/republican-ukraine-depate-gop-primary-aid/](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/23/republican-ukraine-depate-gop-primary-aid/).

[10](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-10).
See, for example, Mark Hannah, Zuri Linetsky, Caroline Gray, and Lucas Robinson,“
Rethinking American Strength: What Divides (and Unites) Voting-Age Americans,” Eurasia
Group Foundation, October 2022. Retrieved from: [https://egfound.org/2022/10/rethinking-american-strength/](https://egfound.org/2022/10/rethinking-american-strength/).

[11](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-11).
Jacob Poushter and Moira Fagan, “Foreign Policy Experts in the US Have Much Different
Views about Threats to the Country than the General Public,” Pew Research Center,
October 23, 2020. Retrieved from: [https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2020/10/23/foreign-policy-experts-in-the-u-s-have-much-different-views-about-threats-to-the-country-than-the-general-public/](https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2020/10/23/foreign-policy-experts-in-the-u-s-have-much-different-views-about-threats-to-the-country-than-the-general-public/).

[12](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-12-13).“
Remarks by President Biden on Supporting Ukraine, Defending Democratic Values, and
Taking Action to Address Global Challenges,” The White House, July 12, 2023. Retrieved
from: [https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/07/12/remarks-by-president-biden-on-supporting-ukraine-defending-democratic-values-and-taking-action-to-address-global-challenges-vilnius-lithuania](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/07/12/remarks-by-president-biden-on-supporting-ukraine-defending-democratic-values-and-taking-action-to-address-global-challenges-vilnius-lithuania)
[/](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/07/12/remarks-by-president-biden-on-supporting-ukraine-defending-democratic-values-and-taking-action-to-address-global-challenges-vilnius-lithuania/).

[13](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-12-13).
Helene Cooper, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Eric Schmitt and Julian E. Barnes, “Troop Deaths
and Injuries in Ukraine War Near 500,000, U.S. Officials Say,” _The New York Times_,
August 18, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/18/us/politics/ukraine-russia-war-casualties.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/18/us/politics/ukraine-russia-war-casualties.html);
Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Lauren Leatherby, “Ukraine Has Gained Ground. But It has
Much Farther to Go,” _The New York Times_, September 20, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/09/20/world/europe/ukraine-war-counteroffensive-robotyne.html](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/09/20/world/europe/ukraine-war-counteroffensive-robotyne.html);“
The War-Weary West: How Governments Can Keep Their Citizens Committed to Ukraine’s
Defense,” _Foreign Affairs_, May 4, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia-war-fatigue-weary-west](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia-war-fatigue-weary-west).

[14](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-14).
Branko Marcetic, “The Danger of Downplaying the Ukrainian Battlefield Toll,” _Responsible
Statecraft_, March 15, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/03/15/the-danger-of-downplaying-the-ukrainian-battlefield-toll/](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/03/15/the-danger-of-downplaying-the-ukrainian-battlefield-toll/).

[15](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-15).
Ben Fox, Aamer Madhani, and Dan Huff, “Push to Arm Ukraine May Put Strain on US 
Weapons Stockpile,”_ PBS News Hour_, May 2, 2022. Retrieved from:[ https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/push-to-arm-ukraine-may-put-strain-on-u-s-weapons-stockpile](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/push-to-arm-ukraine-may-put-strain-on-u-s-weapons-stockpile);
Julia van der Colff, “Building a New American Arsenal,” _War on the Rocks_, March
21, 2023. Retrieved from:[ https://warontherocks.com/2023/03/building-a-new-american-arsenal/](https://warontherocks.com/2023/03/building-a-new-american-arsenal/);
Michael Brenes, “How America Broke Its War Machine,”_ Foreign Affairs_, July 3, 
2023. Retrieved from: [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-america-broke-its-war-machine](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-america-broke-its-war-machine).

[16](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-16-17-18).
Mathew Luxmoore and Michael R. Gordon, “Russia’s Army Learns From Its Mistakes in
Ukraine,” _The Wall Street Journal,_ September 24, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/russias-army-learns-from-its-mistakes-in-ukraine-a6b2eb4](https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/russias-army-learns-from-its-mistakes-in-ukraine-a6b2eb4).

[17](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-16-17-18).
Josh Holder, “Who’s Gaining Ground in Ukraine? This Year, No One,” _The New York
Times_, September 28, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/09/28/world/europe/russia-ukraine-war-map-front-line.html](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/09/28/world/europe/russia-ukraine-war-map-front-line.html).

[18](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-16-17-18).“
How the War in Ukraine Ends: A Conversation with General Mark Milley,” _None Of 
The Above, _March 21, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://www.noneoftheabovepodcast.org/episodes/s4ep14](https://www.noneoftheabovepodcast.org/episodes/s4ep14).

[19](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-19-20-21).“
Russia Lavrov: Ukraine Peace Plan, UN Bid to Revive Black Sea Grain Deal ‘Not Realistic,’”
Reuters, September 23, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-un-lavrov-idAFL1N3AZ0EL](https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-un-lavrov-idAFL1N3AZ0EL).

[20](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-19-20-21).
Mark Hannah, “Biden Should Listen to Zelenskyy on China,” _Politico Magazine_, March
15, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/03/15/china-russia-ukraine-biden-00086961](https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/03/15/china-russia-ukraine-biden-00086961).

[21](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-19-20-21).
David Cohen, “US Won’t Push Ukraine to Negotiate, NSC’s Kirby Says,” _Politico_,
June 7, 2022._ _Retrieved from:_ _[https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/03/kirby-ukraine-russia-war-00043879](https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/03/kirby-ukraine-russia-war-00043879).

[22](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-22).
In the survey instrument, this question excluded reference to injured people as 
a result of a typographical error, and only mentioned the war had killed an estimated
500,000 people.

[23](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-23).
Natasha Bertrand, Kylie Atwood, Kevin Liptak, and Alex Marquardt, “Austin’s assertion
that US wants to ‘weaken’ Russia underlines Biden strategy shift,” CNN, April 26,
2022. Retrieved from: [https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/25/politics/biden-administration-russia-strategy/index.html](https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/25/politics/biden-administration-russia-strategy/index.html)_._

[24](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-24-25).
Ivana Saric, “Blinken: China poses ‘most serious, long-term challenge’ to world 
order,” _Axios_, May 26, 2022. Retrieved from: [https://www.axios.com/2022/05/26/blinken-china-speech-competition](https://www.axios.com/2022/05/26/blinken-china-speech-competition)_._

[25](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-24-25).
Stephen M. Walt, “The AUKUS Dominoes Are Just Starting to Fall,” _Foreign Policy_,
September 18, 2021. Retrieved from: [https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/18/aukus-australia-united-states-submarines-china-really-means/](https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/18/aukus-australia-united-states-submarines-china-really-means/);
Karen Lema, “Philippines Reveals Locations of 4 New Strategic Sites for US Military
Pact,” Reuters, April 3, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-reveals-locations-4-new-strategic-sites-us-military-pact-2023-04-03/](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-reveals-locations-4-new-strategic-sites-us-military-pact-2023-04-03/);
Trevor Hunnicutt and [Nandita Bose](https://www.reuters.com/authors/nandita-bose/),“
Exclusive: Biden Aides in Talks with Vietnam for Arms Deal that Could Irk China,”
Reuters, September 23, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-aides-talks-with-vietnam-arms-deal-that-could-irk-china-2023-09-23/](https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-aides-talks-with-vietnam-arms-deal-that-could-irk-china-2023-09-23/).

[26](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-26).
Zuri Linetsky, “America Prepares for a Pacific War With China It Doesn’t Want,” 
_Foreign Policy_, September 16, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/16/us-china-marines-f-35-pacific-strategy-taiwan/](https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/16/us-china-marines-f-35-pacific-strategy-taiwan/).

[2](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-27)
[7](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-27-28).
James Palmer, “In Beijing Blinken Seeks to Stabilize Ties,” _Foreign Policy_, February
1, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/01/blinken-china-visit-beijing-stabilize-ties/](https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/01/blinken-china-visit-beijing-stabilize-ties/).

[2](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-28)
[8](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-27-28).
Jiachen Shi, “The First Republican Presidential Debate Revealed a Crucial Split 
on China Policy,” _The Diplomat_, September 1, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://thediplomat.com/2023/09/the-first-republican-presidential-debate-revealed-a-crucial-split-on-china-policy/](https://thediplomat.com/2023/09/the-first-republican-presidential-debate-revealed-a-crucial-split-on-china-policy/).

[29](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-29)._“
_Remarks by President Biden Before the 78th Session of the United Nations General
Assembly,” The White House,” September 19, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/09/19/remarks-by-president-biden-before-the-78th-session-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-ny/](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/09/19/remarks-by-president-biden-before-the-78th-session-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-ny/).

[30](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-30-31).
Taylor Page, John Hudson, and Michael Birnbaum, “Biden at UN urges leaders not to
abandon Ukraine.” _Washington Post_, September 19, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/09/19/biden-united-nations-general-assembly-speech/](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/09/19/biden-united-nations-general-assembly-speech/).

[31](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-30-31).
2022 National Security Strategy_,_” The White House, October 12, 2022. Retrieved
from: [https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf);“
2022 National Defense Strategy,”US Department of Defense, October 27, 2022. Retrieved
from: [https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PD](https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF).

[32](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-32).
James Dobbins, “Is NATO Brain Dead?” RAND Corporation, December 3, 2019. Retrieved
from: [https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/12/is-nato-brain-dead.html](https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/12/is-nato-brain-dead.html).

[33](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-33).“
Was NATO Enlargement a Mistake?” Ask the Experts, _Foreign Affairs_, April 19, 2022.
Retrieved from: [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ask-the-experts/2022-04-19/was-nato-enlargement-mistake](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ask-the-experts/2022-04-19/was-nato-enlargement-mistake).

[34](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-34-35).
James Goldgeier, “Why NATO Should Accept Ukraine.” Carnegie Endowment For International
Peace, July 13, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/07/13/why-nato-should-accept-ukraine-pub-90206](https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/07/13/why-nato-should-accept-ukraine-pub-90206).

[35](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-34-35).
Justin Logan and Joshua Shifrinson, “Don’t Let Ukraine Join NATO,” CATO Institute,
July 10, 2023. [https://www.cato.org/commentary/dont-let-ukraine-join-nato](https://www.cato.org/commentary/dont-let-ukraine-join-nato)_._

[36](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-36).
See, for example, Mark Hannah, Zuri Linetsky, Caroline Gray, and Lucas Robinson,“
Rethinking American Strength: What Divides (and Unites) Voting-Age Americans,” Eurasia
Group Foundation, October 2022. Retrieved from: [https://egfound.org/2022/10/rethinking-american-strength/](https://egfound.org/2022/10/rethinking-american-strength/).

[37](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-37-38-39).
Bruce Stokes, “The Decline of the City Upon the Hill,” _Foreign Affairs_, October
17, 2022. Retrieved from: [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/decline-city-upon-hill](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/decline-city-upon-hill).

[3](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-38)
[8](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-37-38-39).
Juan Cole, “How the United States Helped Create the Islamic State,” _The Washington
Post_, November 23, 2015. Retrieved from: [https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/11/23/how-the-united-states-helped-create-the-islamic-state/](https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/11/23/how-the-united-states-helped-create-the-islamic-state/).

[3](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-39)
[9](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-37-38-39).
Alan J. Kuperman, “Obama’s Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention Ended 
in Failure,” _Foreign Affairs_, February 18, 2019. Retrieved from: [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/2019-02-18/obamas-libya-debacle](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/2019-02-18/obamas-libya-debacle);
Mark Mazzetti, Adam Goldman, and Michael S. Schmidt, “Behind the Sudden Death of
a $1 Billion Secret CIA War in Syria,” _The New York Times_, August 2, 2017. Retrieved
from: [https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/world/middleeast/cia-syria-rebel-arm-train-trump.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/world/middleeast/cia-syria-rebel-arm-train-trump.html).

[40](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-40).“
Inaugural Address by President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,” The White House, January 20,
2021. Retrieved from: [https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/01/20/inaugural-address-by-president-joseph-r-biden-jr/](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/01/20/inaugural-address-by-president-joseph-r-biden-jr/).

[41](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-41).
Mark Hannah, “Straight Talk on the Country’s War Addiction,” _The New York Times_,
February 18, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/18/opinion/cold-war-china-ukraine.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/18/opinion/cold-war-china-ukraine.html).

[42](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-42).
Ellen Mitchell, “Defense Department Fails Another Audit, but Makes Progress,” _The
Hill_, November 17, 2022. Retrieved from: [https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3740921-defense-department-fails-another-audit-but-makes-progress/](https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3740921-defense-department-fails-another-audit-but-makes-progress/).

[43](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-43).
Nan Tian, Diego Lopes da Silva, Xiao Llang, Lorenzo Scarazzato, Lucie Béraud-Sudreau,
and Ana Carolina de Oliveira Assis, “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2022,”
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, April 2023. Retrieved from: [https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/2304_fs_milex_2022.pdf](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/2304_fs_milex_2022.pdf);
Pieter D. Wezeman, Justine Gadon, and Siemon T. Wezeman, “Trends in International
Arms Transfers, 2022,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, March 2023.
Retrieved from: [https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/2303_at_fact_sheet_2022_v2.pdf](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/2303_at_fact_sheet_2022_v2.pdf).

[44](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-44).“
US Security Cooperation with Ukraine,” US Department of State, Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs, September 21, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine/](https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine/);_
_Jonathan Masters and Will Merrow, “How Much Aid Has the US Sent Ukraine? Here Are
Six Charts,” Council on Foreign Relations, September 21, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts](https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts).

[45](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-45-46).
Joby Warrick and Anne Gearan, “Biden Has Vowed to Quickly Restore the Iran Nuclear
Deal, But That May be Easier Said Than Done,” _The_ _Washington Post_, December 
9, 2020. Retrieved from_: _[https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/12/09/biden-foreign-policy-iran/](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/12/09/biden-foreign-policy-iran/).

[46](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-45-46).
John Irish, “No Push for Iran Nuclear Talks, US Envoy Says, Due to Protests, Drone
Sales,” _Reuters_, November 14, 2022. Retrieved from: [https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/no-push-iran-nuclear-talks-us-envoy-says-due-protests-drone-sales-2022-11-14/](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/no-push-iran-nuclear-talks-us-envoy-says-due-protests-drone-sales-2022-11-14/).

[47](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-47).“
US Republican Senators Say They Will Not Back Iran Nuclear Deal,” _Al Jazeera_, 
March 14, 2022. Retrieved from: [https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/14/us-republican-senators-say-they-will-not-back-new-iran-nuclear](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/14/us-republican-senators-say-they-will-not-back-new-iran-nuclear).

[48](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-48-49-50).
Julian Borger, “Crown Prince Confirms Saudi Arabia Will Seek Nuclear Arsenal if 
Iran Develops One,” _The Guardian_, September 21, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/21/crown-prince-confirms-saudi-arabia-seek-nuclear-arsenal-iran-develops-one](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/21/crown-prince-confirms-saudi-arabia-seek-nuclear-arsenal-iran-develops-one).

[49](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-48-49-50).
James Acton, “The US Exit From the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Has Fueled a New
Arms Race,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 13, 2021. Retrieved
from: [https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/12/13/u.s.-exit-from-anti-ballistic-missile-treaty-has-fueled-new-arms-race-pub-85977](https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/12/13/u.s.-exit-from-anti-ballistic-missile-treaty-has-fueled-new-arms-race-pub-85977);
Sanya Mansoor, “For Decades, Treaties Helped Keep the World Safe From Nuclear War.
That Era is Over,” _Time_, February 22, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://time.com/6257220/putin-new-start-nuclear-treaty-era-over/](https://time.com/6257220/putin-new-start-nuclear-treaty-era-over/).

[50](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-48-49-50).
Daniel Boffey, “Number of Nuclear Weapons Held by Major Powers Rising, Says Thintank,”
_The Guardian_, June 11, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/12/number-of-nuclear-weapons-held-by-major-powers-rising-says-thinktank](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/12/number-of-nuclear-weapons-held-by-major-powers-rising-says-thinktank).

[5](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-51)
[1](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-51-52).
Caroline Gray, “What Are Sanctions and How Do They Work? History of US Economic 
Sanctions,” _Teen Vogue_, May 22, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://www.teenvogue.com/story/what-are-sanctions](https://www.teenvogue.com/story/what-are-sanctions).

[5](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-52)
[2](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-51-52).
Berit Lindeman and Ivar Dale, “Sanctions on Russia May Not be Working, We Now Know
Why,” _Al Jazeera_, June 5, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/6/5/sanctions-on-russia-may-not-be-working-we-now-know-why](https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/6/5/sanctions-on-russia-may-not-be-working-we-now-know-why).

[53](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-53).
See, for example, Azmat Khan, “Hidden Pentagon Records Reveal Patterns of Failure
in Deadly Airstrikes,” _The New York Times_, December 18, 2021. Retrieved from: 
[https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/12/18/us/airstrikes-pentagon-records-civilian-deaths.html](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/12/18/us/airstrikes-pentagon-records-civilian-deaths.html).

[5](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-54)
[4](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-54-55-56).
Blaise Malley, “House Effort to kill a 22-Year-Old Endless War Bill is a Bipartisan
Affair,” _Responsible Statecraft_, July 12, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/07/12/house-effort-to-kill-a-22-yr-old-endless-war-bill-is-a-bipartisan-affair/](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/07/12/house-effort-to-kill-a-22-yr-old-endless-war-bill-is-a-bipartisan-affair/).

[5](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-55)
[5](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-54-55-56).“
Proven Right: Barbara Lee and the Prophecy of Forever Wars,” _None Of The Above_,
April 27, 2021. Retrieved from: [https://www.noneoftheabovepodcast.org/episodes/s3e2](https://www.noneoftheabovepodcast.org/episodes/s3e2).

[5](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-54-55-56)
[6](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-56).
Leigh Ann Caldwell and Theodoric Meyer, “The Iraq War AUMF Revisted,” _The Washington
Post_, March 8, 2023. Retrieved from: [https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/03/08/iraq-war-aumf-revisited/](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/03/08/iraq-war-aumf-revisited/).

[57](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-57).“
Human and Budgetary Costs to Date of the US War in Afghanistan, 2001-2022,” The 
Costs of War Project, Brown University, August 2021. Retrieved from: [https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures/2021/human-and-budgetary-costs-date-us-war-afghanistan-2001-2022](https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures/2021/human-and-budgetary-costs-date-us-war-afghanistan-2001-2022).

[58](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-58-59).
Mark Hannah, “Why is the Washington Press Corps So Hawkish?” _Foreign Policy_, March
30, 2022. Retrieved from: [https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/30/ukraine-war-media-coverage-hawkish-journalism/](https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/30/ukraine-war-media-coverage-hawkish-journalism/).

[59](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-58-59).
Shamila N. Chaudhary and Colin F. Jackson, “How the Afghanistan War Commission Aims
to Learn from our Longest Conflict,” _The Hill_, August 30, 2023. Retrieved from:
[https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/4176739-how-the-afghanistan-war-commission-aims-to-learn-from-our-longest-conflict/](https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/4176739-how-the-afghanistan-war-commission-aims-to-learn-from-our-longest-conflict/).

[60](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-60).
See, for example, Peter Wehner, “Biden’s Long Trail of Betryals,” _The Atlantic_,
August 18, 2021. Retrieved from: [https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/08/biden-afghanistan-record/619799/](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/08/biden-afghanistan-record/619799/).

[61](https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2023/10/vox-populi-order-and-disorder/#endnote-61).
All data reported in the text is rounded to the nearest whole number.
