NEW REPORT: Battlegrounds

In a democracy, the voice of the people (“vox populi”) is supposed to be the voice of God (“vox dei”). In the United States, leaders are supposed to rely on the consent of the governed. Yet, within the realm of foreign policy, the popular will is not being reflected in the views of elected leaders and experts. Although public opinion can be capricious and grand strategies must be developed to withstand changing sentiments, a fundamental premise of this project is that policymakers must be sensitive and responsive to the wishes of their constituents.

This project seeks to (1) illustrate the chasm which exists between the interests and concerns of foreign policy elites and those of ordinary citizens, and (2) identify the reasons why Americans are increasingly disenfranchised from foreign policy decisions being made in Washington.

The Institute for Global Affairs pursues industry-leading research on geopolitics and global affairs, creates relevant, objective, fact-based content, tools, and programming and partners with people and organizations around the world to drive awareness, increase understanding, and support action. This annual survey is part of the Independent America project, which seeks to explore how US foreign policy could better be tailored to new global realities and to the preferences of American voters.

View our reports from 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 to see more work on this topic.

---

Executive Summary

This year the Institute for Global Affairs (IGA) asked 1,835 Americans their perspectives on key foreign policy issues.

Our findings reveal important differences across parties, candidate preferences, and between the national population and residents of hotly contested battleground states. In addition to a nationally representative sample, we included focused samples of three Rust Belt states (Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan) and three Sun Belt states (Georgia, Arizona, and Nevada), with potential consequences for this year’s presidential election.

Harris leads on critical foreign policy issues nationally, but Trump leads in key swing states.

• Nationally, Kamala Harris is seen as the candidate more likely to pursue a foreign policy which “benefits people like you,” improve America’s international reputation, be a strong leader who advances America’s interests internationally, and less likely to send US troops to an unnecessary war. In swing states, however, Donald Trump has the edge on each of these.
• Where Trump is perceived more favorably than Harris nationally — more likely to reform immigration, end the Gaza and Ukraine wars, and respond effectively to a Chinese attack on Taiwan — he has an even greater margin of favorability in swing states.
• People in Rust Belt states care more about the rise of China and less about climate change than Americans nationwide. Those in Sun Belt states care more than the nationwide population about immigration. These views could bode well for Trump’s candidacy.

Supporters of Kamala Harris and Donald Trump differ on key foreign policy issues.

• Trump supporters appear less hawkish on China than the average Republican, and Harris supporters appear more hawkish on China than the average Democrat. For example, more Republicans than Democrats think the West should prepare for a new Cold War between the US and China (68% vs. 52%), but the margin shrinks when comparing Trump supporters to Harris supporters (66% vs. 54%).
• Harris supporters are 18% more likely than Trump supporters (and 7% more likely than Democrats) to think the US should militarily defend Taiwan. People who intend to vote for a different candidate are least likely to think it should.
• A majority (58%) of Harris supporters think the US should maintain or increase the number of overseas troops while a majority (58%) of Trump supporters think the US should decrease the number. People who intend to vote for a different candidate are aligned with Trump supporters — 56% prefer a troop decrease.
• A majority of Harris supporters are “Wilsonian,” advocating for a rules-based order focused on democracy, liberal economics, and human rights (59%). A plurality of Trump supporters are “Jacksonian,” averse to deep global engagement but supporting a strong military to deter enemies (41%). A plurality of people who plan to vote for candidate besides these two are “Jeffersonian,” wanting to strengthen democracy at home and promote it abroad not by force but by example (48%).  

Republicans and Independents are less hawkish on European security than Democrats. Democrats and Independents are less hawkish on the Gaza war and China than Republicans.

• US goals in Ukraine which would de-escalate the war are prioritized more than twice as often as those which would perpetuate or intensify it. Republicans and Independents are about 20% more likely than Democrats to prioritize avoiding a wider war.
• If Finland, a new NATO ally, were invaded by Russia, after being reminded of NATO’s obligation for collective defense, 76% of Democrats — but only 55% of Republicans and 59% of Independents — would support a US military operation to expel Russian forces.
• Majorities of Democrats (67%) and Independents (55%) believe the US should either end support for Israel’s war effort or make that support conditional on a ceasefire. Only 8% of Democrats but 42% of Republicans think the US must support Israel unconditionally.
• Twice as many Democrats as Republicans think the West needs to cooperate with China should dissuade the US from preparing for a new Cold War. Twice as many Republicans as Democrats think China presents a threat to US security, and so the US should prepare for one.
• Twice as many Democrats think the US should normalize relations with Cuba as should continue to pressure and isolate Cuba (66% vs. 34%), and Republicans are more evenly divided on the issue (45% vs. 55%).

Americans have mixed views of the Biden administration’s foreign policy record. 

• The release of American prisoners from Russia and NATO expansion are seen as among President Biden’s most significant foreign policy successes (though addressing climate change is the top choice among Democrats).
• Republicans and Independents most often point to immigration as one of Biden’s top foreign policy failures. Democrats most often select the US response to the war in Gaza.
• Thirty percent of respondents cite the withdrawal from Afghanistan as one of Biden’s biggest foreign policy failures. However, 62% of Americans believe the Afghanistan war was primarily a failed mission from the start or should have ended when Osama bin Laden was killed. 
• President Biden’s framing of foreign policy as a global struggle between democracy and autocracy may not resonate with most Americans. Though four times as many Democrats as Republicans cite threats to democracy in foreign countries as a top concern, among a list of 12 foreign policy issues, it is the issue Americans care about the least.

Younger and older generations disagree about how US policy should approach Israel’s war in Gaza, a new Cold War with China, and normalizing relations with Cuba.

• Twice as many adults under 30 as those 65 and older think the US must stop supporting Israel’s war in Gaza (23% vs. 11%).
• Twice as many adults 65 and older as those under 30 think the US must support Israel’s war unconditionally (26% vs. 13%). 
• Americans 45 and older are much more likely than Americans under 45 to think the US must prepare for a new Cold War with China (68% vs 47%).
• Two-thirds of adults under 30 think the US should normalize relations with Cuba rather than continue isolating the island nation. A slight majority of Americans 65 and older agree (66% vs. 53%).

Introduction

In our seventh year of polling Americans about their foreign policy views, we have a confession to make: foreign policy does not frequently register as a priority for American voters. Concerns closer to home loom larger than overseas wars and geopolitical competition. But as Americans get ready to vote for a new president in November, debates about America’s international obligations and actions have taken on new urgency.

In short, foreign policy is having a moment. In 2024, the world reckons with the aftermath of a pandemic, a new war in the Middle East, a protracted war in Ukraine, and intensifying geopolitical competition. Early this year, one influential poll revealed an uptick in foreign policy interest. Though the economy remains a top voter issue, about twice as many Americans cited foreign policy as a top priority — and four times as many expressed concern about US involvement overseas — this year as last year.¹

This prioritization of foreign policy has held firm. In September, a Pew survey showed foreign policy as the fourth most important issue for voters.²  A Washington Post poll from earlier in the summer ranked the Gaza and Ukraine wars in the top ten important issues.³

The rise of voter interest in foreign policy offers us some hope here at the Institute for Global Affairs, an organization committed to helping people make sense of geopolitics. Conventional wisdom suggests Americans both know and care little about foreign policy. As a result, foreign policy leaders don’t face much political pressure, and so the popular will isn’t always reflected in Washington’s policy prescriptions. This year’s election, however, could be different.

Foreign policy positions could shape the stakes of this November’s election. If Harris wins, foreign policy analysts argue she could take a more restrained approach, one which reflects a “humbler” view of US influence in the world.⁴ Yet Harris hasn’t articulated a concrete plan for ending or de-escalating the war in Ukraine. Donald Trump promised to immediately end the Ukraine war and avoid “World War III.” Yet his less qualified support for Israel’s war and his significant increase of the US defense budget in his first term obscure his commitment to military restraint.⁵ 

It remains to be seen how voters’ preferences will be reflected in these policies — and in the outcome of the election. But in a year when foreign policy matters more than usual, our survey offers a glimpse into Americans’ foreign policy preferences. For the first time, our survey (fielded August 15-19) includes focused sampling of voting-age adults in critical battleground states alongside a nationally representative sample. We compare the views of voting age adults in the national population with voting age adults in swing states in the Rust Belt (Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan) and Sun Belt (Georgia, Nevada and Arizona). These two groups of swing states offer both candidates the most likely pathways to victory.⁶ 

In our survey, Rust Belt voters — midwestern populations living in America’s industrial heartland — expressed foreign policy preferences which diverged in important ways from Americans as a whole. They were, for example, more concerned about competition with China and trade, but less supportive of US interventionism. Voters in the Sun Belt — an area which has seen rapid business growth and a marked rise in immigration — reported significantly more interest in immigration than the national average.

This election will shape a new era in American foreign policy in important ways. In a healthy democracy, international relations conducted on behalf of the public must be subject to public scrutiny and debate. We have seen how global public health crises, international economic collapse, regional war and insecurity, and mass

Who Took Our Survey?

Specific Findings

Perceptions of the Biden Legacy | Critical Issues on the Ballot | Highlights from Key Swing States | How Americans See America’s Role | Issues for the Next President

Perceptions of the Biden Legacy

The finding that the release of American prisoners from Russia is a significant foreign policy success may be a result of the recent prisoner swap, which included the release of Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich, when our survey was fielded.⁷ Gershkovich was arrested in March 2023 on charges of espionage and sentenced to 16 years in prison, and his case attracted substantial media attention.⁸

More than one third of Democrats identified Biden’s top foreign policy success to be investments in green energy. Provisions for renewable energy and climate change measures were included in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, a key piece of legislation for the Biden administration.⁹ Strengthening European alliances was another core piece of President Biden’s foreign policy agenda, which he highlighted in July’s NATO Summit. An IGA survey released in June found most Americans think Europe should be primarily responsible for its own defense.¹⁰ Yet though it expands America’s defense obligations in Europe, more than one in four consider the expansion of NATO as one of the president’s most significant successes.

Perceptions of foreign policy failures are divided along partisan lines. Biden’s response to immigration is considered the biggest foreign policy failure among Republicans and Independents, closely followed by ending the war in Afghanistan. A plurality of Democrats consider the handling of the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza to be a top foreign policy failure. Republicans and Independents appear more likely to prioritize immigration and security over other issues, while Democrats are more likely to prioritize humanitarian issues and climate change over other issues. In the run-up to the election, Republicans will likely seek to implicate Kamala Harris in President Biden’s perceived foreign policy failures, especially immigration. Harris has drawn on her past as a prosecutor to signal she will be tough on border security (and crime), but she will need to strike a delicate balance — this could appeal to moderate Republicans and Independents, but alienate some progressive Democrats.

Sixty-three percent more Americans think this as are primarily concerned about credibility as a global leader or having abandoned the war’s humanitarian gains, suggesting most supported the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan even as they deem the execution a failure. Republicans roundly criticized the withdrawal for compromising the safety of American personnel and Afghans working for the US government. A recent report by congressional Republicans underscores the deaths of 13 American service members in the final days of troop withdrawals, and assigns partial blame to Vice President Kamala Harris. President Trump laid the groundwork for the withdrawal in a negotiated deal with the Taliban as part of the 2020 Doha Agreement.¹¹ Twice as many Republicans as Independents think the withdrawal primarily hurt America’s credibility as a global leader. Independents (34%) are more likely than Democrats (29%) and Republicans (23%) to think the war was primarily a failed mission from the start because the US military should not be in the business of nation-building. It’s likely they would be most reluctant to attempt nation-building elsewhere.

Critical Issues on the Ballot

Americans identified immigration as their top foreign policy concern. It has received more advertising spending than any other campaign issue, and both candidates seek to be perceived as tough on the border.¹² A majority of Republicans and a plurality of Independents care most about immigration, while fewer than one in five Democrats selected it as a top issue, signaling a high degree of partisan disagreement. In the wake of Republican attacks on immigration, Kamala Harris highlighted her background as a prosecutor to argue she will be tough on gangs, drug cartels, and human traffickers at the border.¹³ Though she may appeal to Independents with this argument, she also risks alienating Democrats.

The three foreign policy issues about which Americans say they care most — immigration, climate change, terrorism — are also domestic issues to some extent. Perhaps because the campaigns know they are top concerns, they are often sensationalized in the run-up to elections. Climate change, cyber-attacks and hacking, and terrorism were all equally important foreign policy issues for Independents. Terrorism ranked second in foreign policy issues Republicans care most about. Although concerns about international terrorism have largely dissipated since 9/11, the fear associated directly with the safety of American citizens continues to make terrorism a greater concern than other topics.¹⁴ More than one in four Americans selected cyber-attacks and hacking, which is fairly consistent across party lines.

The Ukraine war, Israel’s war in Gaza, and the rise of China all placed in the bottom five foreign policy issues for Americans. While they are the subject of ample discussion among foreign policy experts, neither issue is cited by more than one in five Americans. More than four times as many Democrats as Republicans and (and twice as many Democrats as Independents) cite threats to democracy in foreign countries as a top issue. Still, fewer than one in five Democrats do so. This suggests President Biden’s sweeping rhetoric about safeguarding democracy abroad might not resonate with most Americans, who appear more concerned with issues typically viewed as relevant to their day-to-day lives or which directly threaten their security.

A plurality of Americans think the United States must make its support for Israel’s war effort conditional on a ceasefire, indicating general support for Israel may be slipping as that country persists in the prosecution of its war. Democrats are more than twice as likely to think US support must be conditional than the United States must end its support of Israel’s military campaign altogether. But fewer than one in ten Democrats think the United States must support Israel unconditionally. Independents are split more or less evenly. “The US must continue to provide support while supplying humanitarian aid to Gaza” is the least selected response among Republicans and Independents, perhaps because they perceive this position as trying to play both sides without a commitment to end the conflict.

Pluralities across all age groups think the United States must make its support for Israel’s war effort conditional on reaching a ceasefire, with adults under 30 the most likely to think so. Adults under 30 are also more than twice as likely as those 65 and older to think the United States must stop supporting Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. Although fewer than one in four adults under 30 selected Israel’s war in Gaza as a foreign policy issue they most care about, one third did select “protecting vulnerable populations and human rights.” It is not surprising that students on college campuses protest against what some human rights experts have deemed war crimes and genocide in Gaza.¹⁵ While the conduct and rhetoric of protesters might not represent younger adults in general, the concentration of Americans who hold this position is greatest in this age cohort. Generational differences found in a 2024 Pew Survey show older adults have a more favorable view of Israel, and may be more likely to interpret criticism of Israeli policy as antisemitic.¹⁶

A majority of Americans want the United States and other NATO countries to push Ukraine toward a negotiated settlement with Russia. The war’s human toll is the most frequently cited reason, with a plurality selecting “the war has killed or injured hundreds of thousands of people, and it needs to stop.” After more than two years of fighting and Ukraine’s counteroffensive failing to substantially alter the trajectory of the war, Americans do not appear confident Ukraine can achieve outright victory. Roughly a quarter of those in favor of a negotiated settlement think “the West can’t afford to keep supporting this war indefinitely.”

The desire to end the war in Ukraine and avoid a wider conflict transcends party lines. “Weakening Russia to punish it for its aggression” was the least cited goal for the United States in Ukraine among Democrats, Republicans, and Independents alike. This indicates the majority of Americans do not necessarily view this conflict through a Cold War lens, but think about it primarily in terms of the human and financial costs. Democrats are most likely to cite “deterring strong autocratic countries from invading weaker democratic neighbors” as a primary US goal, suggesting they do care about protecting democracy abroad. But it is not among their top priorities.

Adults who intend to vote for Donald Trump are about 30% more likely than those intending to vote for Kamala Harris to cite “avoiding direct war between nuclear-armed powers” as a primary US goal in Ukraine. Of the adults who intend to vote for a candidate other than Trump or Harris, 54% cite this same goal. Trump claims his relationship with Putin will help him negotiate a swift end to the war and this may appeal to these voters.¹⁷ Meanwhile, Harris supporters are about 50% more likely than Trump supporters to select “preventing the further suffering of Ukrainians” as a primary US goal. Protecting vulnerable populations and human rights matters to Harris supporters but leaning into the security risks associated with a prolonged proxy war with Russia could appeal more to undecided voters.

The majority of Americans think the West should prepare for a new Cold War between the United States and China. Sixty-eight percent of Republicans think so. Democrats more frequently cite the threat China poses to its neighbors’ security and regional stability. Disputed claims in the South China Sea have led several neighboring countries — including Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines — to conduct joint military exercises with the United States and allies.¹⁸ Republicans and Independents, however, are more likely to perceive the threat as primarily to US security. While a slim majority (52%) of Democrats favor preparing for a new Cold War, they are more likely than Republicans and Independents to think the West should cooperate as well as compete with China.

The gap between Democrats and Republicans on whether the West should prepare for a new Cold War with China narrows when looking at 2024 presidential candidate preference. While Republicans are about 30% more likely than Democrats to respond “yes” to the question, those who intend to vote for Trump are 22% more likely than Harris supporters to respond “yes.” Therefore, Trump supporters tend to be slightly less hawkish on China than the average Republican and Harris supporters tend to be slightly more hawkish on China than the average Democrat. A slight majority (51%) of adults who intend to vote for a candidate other than Trump or Harris think the West should not prepare for a new Cold War with China, suggesting they are less hawkish on China than supporters of either candidate.

Republican vice presidential nominee J.D. Vance has emphasized competition with China as a key issue of the 2024 presidential campaign. Particularly in the Rust Belt, where deindustrialization has seen the disappearance of manufacturing jobs, Vance has applied the same playbook often used with immigration, arguing that China’s economic rise threatens US jobs and the possibility of the American dream.¹⁹ Harris’s comparatively less hawkish position on China could appeal to Independents and more moderate Trump supporters.

Older adults who remember the Cold War may view China like the former Soviet Union, perceiving a greater threat to US security than younger adults who came of age after the United States began to normalize diplomatic and trade relations with China in the late 1970s. Many younger adults think the West should not prepare for a new Cold War because the West exaggerates the threat of China and could create unnecessary tension. They have grown up seeing “Made in China” on consumer goods, and increasingly turn to Chinese retail giants like Shein and Temu for affordable products.²⁰ Many are active on the Chinese-owned social media platform TikTok and, according to a survey by Pew, are the least likely age group to support proposals to ban TikTok in the United States.²¹

China has long aimed for reunification with Taiwan, whether peacefully or by force. The democratically elected ruling party of Taiwan, the Democratic Progressive Party, favors national independence. The United States holds a “One China” policy which maintains strategic ambiguity on the matter of defending Taiwan in the event of an attack from China.²² With mounting Chinese aggression in the South China Sea and increased hawkishness on China from the foreign policy establishment, the American public seems more receptive to the idea of militarily defending Taiwan. For the first time, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found a slim majority (52%) of Americans support committing US troops should China invade Taiwan.²³ Our data confirm there is more support for defending Taiwan than not, but more than a third of Americans still have no opinion. This could mean they either do not feel they have enough information to form an informed opinion, or they simply do not care enough about the issue.

Democrats and Republicans are almost perfectly aligned on the defense of Taiwan, with 44% of Democrats and 45% of Republicans in favor. However, adults who intend to vote for Kamala Harris are 18% more likely than those intending to vote for Donald Trump to think the United States should militarily defend Taiwan. Trump voters appear to be less hawkish than the average Republican, and in the case of Taiwan, less hawkish than Harris voters. Independents are divided with 37% in favor, 27% against, and 41% reporting no opinion. Nearly a third of adults who intend to vote for a candidate other than Trump or Harris are against the United States defending Taiwan, departing from the broader trend, and the opposition among Independents exceeds the percentage of those in favor by one point. The large number of respondents without an opinion suggests the defense of Taiwan is not a particularly strong issue for candidates to focus on, as the public appears less engaged — unless they can effectively connect Taiwan to a broader message about China and America’s role in the world.

Highlights from Key Swing States

Recent polls show a tight race between Donald Trump and Kamala Harris. In swing states, foreign policy could play an outsized role in deciding the outcome. Some young voters who consider the handling of Israel’s war in Gaza as a foreign policy failure of the Biden administration may not vote for Harris. It is unclear to what degree voters associate Harris with Biden’s policies.

Americans in swing states think Trump is most likely to pursue a foreign policy that benefits Americans (53%) compared to Americans nationally who trust Harris more (53%). They also think Trump is more likely to end the wars in Ukraine and Gaza (58%), reform America’s immigration system for the better (56%), and respond effectively if China attacks Taiwan (58%) compared to the national population.

Nearly twice as many Americans, nationally and in swing states, want to see military spending decrease rather than increase. Americans in the Rust Belt — a name used to describe states known for their manufacturing, steel, and automotive industries — are the least supportive of increasing military spending and also tend to be less supportive of other forms of international engagement. Rust Belt states have been particularly hard hit by the flight of US manufacturing overseas, which could lead to a regional sentiment against government spending on issues overseas.

Rust Belt Americans are less supportive of international organizations than the national population (51% vs. 58%). They are also less likely to favor an increase in US troop presence in the Middle East in response to Israel’s war in Gaza compared to Americans more broadly (18% vs. 23%). In short, Americans in the Rust Belt tend to think the United States should be less involved internationally, perhaps reflecting a greater desire to prioritize domestic issues.

Immigration, climate change, and terrorism top the list of issues Americans care most about, regardless of party or geography. However, the degree to which they care about these issues varies. Immigration is a more significant concern across swing states than elsewhere. Sun Belt Americans care about it most. Arizona, Nevada, and Georgia — the three Sun Belt states featured in this survey — have each grappled with record levels of immigration. Phoenix, Las Vegas, and Atlanta are among the twenty cities with the largest foreign-born populations.²⁴

More Americans in Rust Belt and Sun Belt states selected terrorism than climate change. People in the Rust Belt, whose industries have been impacted by outsourcing, more frequently than most Americans cite the rise of China among the issues they care most about.

Since the beginning of the Cold War, the United States has engaged in a number of armed conflicts abroad without congressional approval. There were periods with greater congressional oversight after the Vietnam War, but a marked decline in congressional influence over military force began with the Gulf War and intensified after 9/11. Many of the mechanisms that enable the executive branch to wield military power remain in place, including three different Authorizations for Use of Military Force (AUMF). The 2001 AUMF has since been used against a wide range of actors, most recently the Houthi movement and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard.²⁵ The Senate rejected an attempt to repeal that law in 2023.²⁶ Americans 65 and older strongly support requiring congressional approval (79%). Democrats are least likely to support requirements (70%), with more support from Republicans (77%) and Independents (79%) — though this could be skewed by the current Democratic administration.

How Americans See America’s Role

Professor Walter Russell Mead identifies four US foreign policy traditions: Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, Jacksonian, and Wilsonian. These ideal types have dominated public sentiment and competed with one another for influence throughout the United States’ history.²⁷ In order to determine Americans’ alignment with these traditions, we asked respondents three questions about their views on the priorities and purpose of US foreign policy. Survey takers were assigned a category if two of their responses corresponded to one of the four schools of thought.²⁸

Hamiltonianism derives from the philosophy espoused by the founding father and first US Treasury Secretary. It emphasizes commerce as the engine of American prosperity, civic nationalism as the glue that holds America together, and pragmatism to temper ambitions to remake the world. A leading worldview during the Cold War, Hamiltonianism fell out of fashion in the 1990s. While Mead makes a case for the revival of this tradition, few Americans, according to our survey, hold Hamiltonian sentiments.²⁹

Jeffersonianism is a more prevalent view today in the United States. More than a third of Americans hold views consistent with the tradition — a proportion which has held steady since we first fielded this survey in 2018. An ideological challenger to Hamiltonian points of view, Jeffersonians believe America is secure when it husbands its resources and focuses the bulk of its attention on issues close to home. The United States is limited in its ability to shape the world, and interventionism leads to blowback. Modern Jeffersonians, Mead argues, came into prominence as a reaction to the military misadventures in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya.³⁰

Wilsonianism, named after US President Woodrow Wilson, emerged during the First World War, found its footing in the Second, and hit its stride when America emerged as the world’s sole superpower at the end of the Cold War. Wilsonianism seeks to promote a rules-based order premised on democracy, liberal economics, and respect for human rights.

While some of the more ambitious Wilsonian assumptions of the post-Cold War era have since been undermined — e.g., that liberal trade policies would constrain authoritarianism in China or that US-led nation-building efforts could build stable democracies — our survey nevertheless reveals an uptick in the number of Wilsonians. The Wilsonian tradition hit its lowest mark in 2021 amid America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan.³¹ Today, as the United States supports Ukraine’s and Israel’s wars, nearly two in five Americans fit this mold. 

Jacksonianism is the fourth tradition in Mead’s taxonomy. Derived from the politics of President Andrew Jackson, this worldview tends to distrust international institutions specifically and deep engagement with the world generally. Yet it supports the development of a strong military that can respond to threats with overwhelming force. Contemporary Jacksonian sentiment has become more prevalent with the rise of right-wing populism. “America has suddenly become a more Jacksonian nation,” Mead declared following the assassination attempt of former President Trump. Indeed, Jacksonianism is on the rise after it began to decline at the tail end of Trump’s presidency — though less than one in four Americans can currently be described as such.³²

The Jacksonian resurgence, if there is one, is primarily a Republican phenomenon. A plurality of Republicans (33%) are Jacksonians, while only 15% of Independents and 4% of Democrats hold this worldview. The percentage is even higher among Trump supporters. In many ways, Trump descends from this tradition. His unilateralism is well documented. As president, he scorned global institutions like the United Nations and withdrew the United States from the Iran nuclear deal, Paris Climate Accords, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. His campaign promises to achieve “peace through strength,” and, should he win in November, is expected to greatly increase military spending — even if fewer than a third of his supporters (30%) think maintaining overwhelming military strength is the best way to keep the United States safe.³³ At the same time, he pitches himself as a peacemaker, critical of wars peripheral to American interests. His campaign also promises to enact sweeping tariffs on goods imported into the United States. 

Nearly half (46%) of Democrats — and an even greater number of Harris supporters — are, by contrast, Wilsonian. The Biden administration distanced itself from certain policies  associated with this tradition, notably the promotion of democracy and human rights through military intervention in places such as Afghanistan. But Biden has embraced other aspects. His rhetoric paints a world caught in a struggle between democracy and authoritarianism in which America is the “arsenal of democracy.”³⁴ America, he contends, has a moral and strategic obligation to support Ukraine and Israel in their wars against Russia and Hamas. 

Harris is expected to pick up where Biden left off on foreign policy, but many speculate she could take a more modest approach to foreign engagement, in which diplomacy is prioritized over the military, and issues at home are prioritized over those abroad. Though Harris has embraced some of Biden’s understanding of American indispensability, her ticket’s anti-war credentials and comments distancing herself from Biden’s Israel policy could resonate with other Americans — 32% of Independents, 24% of Republicans, and 26% of Americans are Jeffersonian in their outlook.³⁵  

The traditions in Mead’s typology hold different assumptions about the purpose of America’s power in the world. A plurality (41%) of Americans hold the Jeffersonian view that the primary obligation of the US government is maintaining constitutional rights and liberties. More than a quarter think it is the Wilsonian view: to promote democracy abroad (26%). Just shy of a quarter selected the Jacksonian view: to protect the United States from foreign threats and stop other countries from taking advantage of it (24%). Fewer still think the primary obligation is the Hamiltonian expansion of trade connections and promotion of American prosperity (10%). 

More than a third of Republicans and Democrats and nearly half of Independents think the US government’s primary obligation is to maintain American rights and liberties. Democrats and Republicans differ in other ways. A plurality of Republicans hold the Jacksonian view that the government has an obligation to stop other countries from taking advantage of the United States. Nearly half of Democrats, by contrast, think the United States government is obligated to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law around the world. 

Although few Americans think trade and economics should be the government’s primary foreign policy objective, young people — those between the ages of 18 and 29 — are the most likely to think it should be. Whether informed by early memories of the 2008 financial crisis, COVID-19 lockdowns, or the rising cost of living, young Americans are more financially insecure than previous generations.³⁶ Even still, economics as the goal of foreign policy is their least frequently selected response.³⁷ Among Americans 65 and older, only 4% think expanding prosperity is the US government’s primary obligation.

Pluralities across all age groups think the US government’s main focus should be on protecting constitutional rights and liberties. The proportion of Americans who hold this view increases with age. More than half of Americans 65 and older — and to a greater extent than any other cohort — think this is the most important obligation.

The belief in American exceptionalism — the idea that the United States is endowed with unique qualities that set it apart from the world’s other nations — increases with age. 

Americans’ views today may be shaped by perceptions of financial insecurity, the legacies of inconclusive wars, gridlock and polarization in government, the emergence of other geopolitical powers, as well as a panoply of competing narratives propagated in an increasingly fragmented media environment. 

Interpretations of the traits, values, and principles which distinguish America vary. Biden’s oft-repeated phrase that America must lead by the power of its example is one variation. Trump tells a different story in which the United States must look to the past to restore its greatness. Harris espouses a more inclusive vision in which America continues to be an indispensable nation. 

While Harris asserts America is obligated to uphold democracy around the world, more of her supporters than Trump supporters think the United States is not exceptional. Among those who intend to vote for Harris, 48% think the United States is exceptional because of what it represents, 18% think it is because of what it has done for the world, and 34% believe the United States isn’t exceptional. Among Trump supporters, 62% think America is exceptional for what it represents, 21% think it is for what it has done, and only 16% think it isn’t exceptional.

Mead highlights the mistrust of elites as another aspect of the Jacksonian tradition. Donald Trump exemplifies this tradition as he disparages government officials, high and low.³⁸ He accuses a “deep state” of undermining his presidency and presidential campaigns. In the realm of foreign policy, his administration oversaw the hollowing out of career officers from the State Department and questioned orthodoxies within the foreign policy establishment, such as the sanctity of alliances.³⁹ Critics of Trump’s foreign policy praised the so-called “adults in the room” — those military leaders, appointed officials, and career bureaucrats, who, for better or worse pushed back against Trump’s foreign policy agenda — and these establishmentarians drew opprobrium from the former president. 

Americans are generally skeptical that foreign policy leaders in Washington have their best interests in mind. More than half believe foreign policymakers rarely or never pursue the interests of people like them. Yet, Democrats have much more faith than the public as a whole. More than half say policymakers often or constantly try to make decisions reflecting their interests. Republicans and Independents are much less trusting. Roughly three in four lack trust in foreign policy elites. 

More than a third of Americans remain deeply invested in America’s presence abroad and want to increase both diplomatic and military engagement. A slim majority of Harris supporters favor this type of global engagement (51%). More than a quarter of Americans want to decrease both diplomatic and military engagement overseas, signaling a desire to be less involved in international affairs and to focus more on domestic issues. A plurality of Republicans and a larger plurality of Trump supporters favor this level of global engagement, as well as a plurality of Independents.

Less than a quarter of Americans want to increase diplomatic engagement but decrease military engagement, which may entail withdrawing troops stationed overseas while playing a key role in international organizations. This is the second most common view among Democrats and the least common among Republicans. Relatively few want to increase military engagement but decrease diplomatic engagement, a view least commonly held among Democrats and Independents.

Americans hold mixed views of America’s military posture — about half think the United States should decrease or withdraw the troops it stations abroad and shift responsibility for international security to its allies. A slim majority of Republicans and even more independents support a reduced military footprint. 

A slight majority of Democrats, by contrast, support an equal or greater role for the US military abroad. The gulf between those who intend to vote for Harris and those who intend to vote for Trump is even greater. While 58% of Harris supporters think the United States should maintain or increase its troops abroad, the same percentage of Trump supporters think the United States should decrease its military footprint. Voters who intend to vote for another candidate align with Trump supporters — 56% prefer a decrease.

President Biden came into office determined to shift America’s national security focus to Asia. The Biden administration withdrew US troops from Afghanistan, etched a security pact with Australia and the United Kingdom, and expanded troop access to the Philippines. This initiative may guide US policy for decades. Yet foreign policy during the Biden administration largely focused on the Middle East and Europe.

In the Middle East, Washington has spent time and energy supporting Israel in its war in Gaza, brokering a ceasefire, and negotiating a security pact with Saudi Arabia –– all while managing the war’s escalatory risks.

President Biden justifies the deployment of US assets to the Middle East, notably in the Red Sea, as a geopolitical necessity, but this is the region where the deployment of the US military appears most controversial for Democrats. Fewer than a fifth of Democrats support increasing troops to the region, while roughly half support a decrease either because they think the United States should rely on allies more or because the US military should be relied on less.

Among Republicans, there is a strong desire to maintain or increase America’s military presence in the Middle East. Despite the Biden administration’s robust support for Israel, Republican lawmakers have criticized the delay in the transfer of certain weapons and accused the administration of appeasing Iran. Republicans  are twice as likely as Democrats to think more troops should be deployed to the region, and more than a quarter of Republicans think the number of troops stationed there is “about right.” Fewer than half think more service members should be brought home.

Independents, meanwhile, are nearly split across all four answer options: About half support bringing troops home for one reason or another.

If the future of America’s military presence in the Middle East is a cleavage issue among Democrats, then it’s Europe that stokes divisions among Republicans. Donald Trump frequently denigrates the transatlantic alliance, and his candidacy has raised concerns that the United States could reduce its role in NATO, if not withdraw from the pact entirely. Some on the shortlist to join the Trump administration see Europe as a distraction from Asia.⁴⁰

Among Republicans, about as many support either decreasing or removing most US forces from the continent as support the status quo. But it’s not only Republicans who are wary of overcommitting US troops, weapons, and material to Europe. Few Independents and Democrats think it’s necessary for the United States to deploy more troops to the continent to defend and deter attacks on European countries. However, most Democrats support maintaining the current number of troops stationed in Europe, while Independents and Republicans are both divided on whether troop levels should be maintained, or if they should be decreased or withdrawn entirely from Europe.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 sparked a rich debate on the future of America’s role in Europe.⁴¹ For some, it demonstrates the importance of America in the alliance. Biden, who calls the alliance “sacrosanct,” permanently increased the number of American troops on NATO’s eastern flank and reassured Europe of America’s commitment to the continent.⁴² But for others, it shows the alliance to be a liability for the United States.⁴³ Yet, few officials, analysts, or Americans generally would contest the notion that countries in Europe could invest more in its security.⁴⁴

Few Americans think the United States should increase its military presence in Europe. Half say it should stay the same, and just over a quarter think the United States should shift more responsibility to the Europeans.

Issues for the Next President

Prison exchanges negotiated by the Biden administration with the Russian government have been noted as a major foreign policy success by Americans, regardless of partisan affiliation.⁴⁵ This preference for negotiation holds across partisan lines. Americans 65 and older support negotiation more than their younger peers, including adults under age 30 (71% vs. 63%).⁴⁶ People who believe the United States should continue to work to rekindle the 2015 Iran nuclear deal are slightly more likely to believe in negotiation more broadly than people who do not support restarting the nuclear deal (68% vs. 55%).⁴⁷ There are similar trends between those who believe that the United States should pursue a settlement in the Russia-Ukraine War and those who do not (69% vs. 59%).⁴⁸ This indicates that robust attempts at negotiation are a general preference of Americans, regardless of the geopolitical context.

The United States has maintained a general embargo on Cuban exports since 1962. Relations thawed briefly during the Obama administration, but the Trump administration resumed all sanctions in 2017. The United Nation General Assembly has criticized the embargo since it restricts Cubans’ access to essential goods like food and medicine. Americans support normalizing relations with Cuba by a slim majority (56%). A majority of Independents support normalization (55%) while Republicans oppose it by the same margin (55%). Americans in Rust Belt states support normalization by a slightly wider margin than the general population (61%).⁴⁹

Relations with Cuba have historically been a campaign issue during presidential elections. Florida, with the largest Cuban-American population, has become more solidly Republican and is no longer a swing state. This year, the Biden administration quietly lifted some financial restrictions on Cuban businesses.⁵⁰

The 2015 Iran nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), ended in 2018 when the Trump administration pulled the United States out of the plan. Despite efforts by the Biden administration to revive the deal, negotiations have stalled. Support for negotiating with Iran varies by age. Americans 65 and older are vastly more supportive of continued negotiations (90%), whereas younger people are less supportive and those who are 18 to 29 are the least supportive (77%). Although Democrats are 10% more likely than Republicans to support negotiations with Iran, Harris voters are 17% more likely to think so than Trump voters.⁵¹

NATO admitted Finland as a member in 2023. Under Article 5 of NATO’s Charter, countries “agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” The Trump administration often criticized other member countries for not contributing a fair share to allied security costs. This skepticism raised concerns among NATO partners that the United States might not defend them in the event of a war. Although Trump voters are less unified on this issue than other Americans, a majority still support a hypothetical military operation in Finland (51%). Republicans are more supportive than Trump voters (56%), and Harris voters are more supportive than Democrats (78% vs. 75%).⁵² 

In this question, respondents were presented with six different decision-making guidelines and asked to select which one they think should guide policymakers in a hypothetical Russian invasion of Finland. This question was asked after respondents had already chosen whether or not the United States should intervene. Out of the six response options, three suggest policymakers would intervene and three suggest that they would not. Respondents were free to select any of the six guidelines, regardless of their answer to the prior question. 

Harris voters are most likely (43%) to think that maintaining US credibility among allies should guide decision-making. Among respondents who think that the United States should intervene to protect Finland, almost half (48%) express concern about maintaining US credibility among allies, while one in five worry that Russia would invade more countries unless stopped (22%). Among respondents who think the United States should not intervene to protect Finland, almost a third fear potential nuclear escalation (32%), while around a fifth cite lack of US interests in Finland (22%) and another fifth cite harm to the US economy (18%).⁵³

The US military budget is the largest in the world, with 37% of global defense spending in 2023, three times as much as China.⁵⁴ Some policymakers argue that given the global posture of the United States, this budget is not enough to maintain the armed forces. Others argue this money could be spent elsewhere. Over half of Americans support maintaining the military budget (53%) and almost a third support decreasing the budget (31%). Less than one in five support increasing the budget (16%). Half of those who intend to vote for Trump want to maintain the budget and the other half are equally divided between increasing (24%) and decreasing (24%) the military budget. Only 11% of Democrats support increasing the budget.

Methodology and Acknowledgements 

This survey was developed and commissioned by the Institute for Global Affairs. The survey instrument was written by Mark Hannah and Lucas Robinson. They were joined by Eloise Cassier and Ransom Miller for analysis and interpretation. It was distributed online by YouGov to a sample of 1,835 voting age adults in the United States between August 15 and August 22, 2024. This included over-samples of voting age adults in Pennsylvania (N=350), Georgia (N=350), pooled Rust Belt states (N=500 from Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin) and Sun Belt states (N=500 from Arizona, Nevada, and Georgia).

A nationally representative sample was surveyed and statistically significant findings are reported with a margin of error of +/-3.9% for national and pooled swing state samples. The margin of error for the pooled Rust Belt is +/-5.6% and Sun Belt samples is +/-5.7% and for the Pennsylvania and Georgia state-specific samples, +/-6% and +/-6.6% respectively. 

To achieve these representative samples, YouGov fielded general population and state level surveys and utilized a sample matching approach. YouGov sent targeted email invitations to panelists based on their pre-profiled demographic characteristics. To match survey participants to the YouGov population frame, more interviews than needed are collected. The final sample of respondents to this survey were matched to a more complete population frame, selecting the closest matches to the population on the interlocking targets on gender, race, age, and education. Matched interviews were weighted to the population frame using propensity scores. The weighting equation included gender, race, age, education, region, and 2020 presidential vote choice. Population weights were normalized to equal sample size.

YouGov sources respondents from its opt-in survey panel, composed of approximately 1 million US residents who agreed to participate in YouGov’s Web surveys. Panel members are recruited using multiple methods to help ensure diversity in the panel population. Recruiting methods include Web advertising campaigns (public surveys), permission-based email campaigns, partner-sponsored solicitations, SMS-to-Web recruitment (voter registration-based sampling). Whenever reference is made in this report to a “significant” or “statistically significant” relationship, significance is established beyond the 0.05 level. Graphics included in the report are summary statistics or cross-tabulations.

The general population survey was distributed online by YouGov to a sample of 1,000 voting age adults in the United States between August 15 and August 19, 2024. YouGov collected over-samples of voting age adults in Pennsylvania (N=350), Georgia (N=350), pooled Rust Belt states (N=500 from Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin) and Sun Belt states (N=500 from Arizona, Nevada, and Georgia).  90% of the swing state oversample was collected between August 15 and 19, with a small number of additional cases collected between August 20 and 22, 2024. This time frame overlapped with the Democratic National Convention (August 19-22, 2024), and was about one month after the first assassination attempt on President Trump. As with any public opinion survey, news consumption of current events might have a short-term effect on respondents’ views, but the attitudes and opinions expressed in our survey are likely as durable as those in any survey. During this time, Robert F. Kennedy Jr. was a presidential candidate, and response options for candidate preferences included Harris, Trump, Kennedy, and Other. Because Kennedy exited the race, our analysis combines voters who intended to vote for Kennedy with those who intended to vote for Other.

IGA thanks its nonresident fellows, Andrew Payne from the City, University of London and Rachel George from the Council on Foreign Relations, for their collaboration on and contributions to the survey draft. IGA alone takes responsibility for the validity of the survey and this analysis. We welcome any questions about the methodology and data from other researchers: info@instituteforglobalaffairs.org.

About IGA

IGA pursues industry-leading research on geopolitics and global affairs, creates relevant, objective, fact-based content, tools, and programming, and partners around the world to drive awareness, increase understanding, and support action.

Mark Hannah is a senior fellow at IGA, where he leads the Independent America program. He has been a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a political partner at the Truman National Security Project. He studied at the University of Pennsylvania (B.A.), Columbia University (M.Sc.), and the University of Southern California (Ph.D.).

Lucas Robinson is a senior research associate and digital media manager at IGA. He studied history at the University of California, Los Angeles (B.A.) and theory and history of international relations at the London School of Economics (M.Sc.).

Eloise Cassier is a research associate at IGA. She studied international relations and journalism at New York University (B.A.) and international affairs and global justice at Brooklyn College (M.A.).

Ransom Miller is a research associate at IGA. He studied global affairs and economics at the University of California, Berkeley (B.A.).

Endnotes

1. Will Weissert and Linley Sanders, “More Americans think foreign policy should be a top US priority for 2024, an AP-NORC poll finds,” Associated Press, January 1, 2024. Retrieved from https://apnews.com/article/2024-top-issues-poll-foreign-policy-israel-d89db59deb07f53382cc9292b49f4d1c.

2. Issues and the 2024 election, in “In Tied Presidential Race, Harris and Trump Have Contrasting Strengths, Weaknesses,” Pew Research Center, September 9, 2024. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/09/09/issues-and-the-2024-election/.

3. Eric Lau, Susie Webb, and Hannah Dormido, “These topics dominated the Trump-Biden debate,” The Washington Post, June 27, 2024. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/06/27/debate-topics-economy-abortion-democracy-war/.

4. Michael Hirsch, “Preparing for a Less Arrogant America,” Foreign Policy. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/20/kamala-harris-foreign-policy-advisors-philip-gordon-rebecca-lissner/; “How the views of current advisers might shape Harris’ foreign policy as president,” NPR, September 9, 2024. Retrieved from https://www.npr.org/transcripts/nx-s1-5094242.

5. “Donald Trump’s Positions,” Candidate Tracker, Council on Foreign Relations, accessed September 12, 2024. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/election2024/candidate-tracker/donald-trump.

6. Robert Tait, “Harris has two paths to victory – Rust belt or Sun belt, polling analysts say,” The Guardian, August 16, 2024. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/article/2024/aug/16/kamala-harris-polls-key-states.

7. Ivana Kottasová and Anna Chernova, “Who was freed in major prisoner swap between Russia and the West?” CNN, August 2, 2024. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2024/08/01/world/who-are-detainees-russia-us-prisoner-swap-intl/index.html.

8. Chantal Da Silva, “Journalist Evan Gershkovich sentenced to 16 years by Russian court in case US slams as a sham,” July 19, 2024. Retrieved from https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/us-journalist-evan-gershkovich-jailed-16-years-court-russia-rcna162678.

9. Jack Conness, “Inflation Reduction Act Two Years Later: Clean Manufacturing Investment Boom,” Forbes, Aug 25, 2024. Retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/sites/energyinnovation/2024/08/25/inflation-reduction-act-two-years-later-clean-energy-manufacturing-investments-boost-communities-create-jobs/

10. European Security: European vs. American Views, in “The New Atlanticism,” Institute for Global Affairs, June, 2024. Retrieved from https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/IGA-Modeling-Democracy-2024-The-New-Atlanticism.pdf.

11. Jennifer Hansler and Kylie Atwood, “House Republicans and Democrats issue dueling documents casting blame for mistakes made in US withdrawal from Afghanistan, ” CNN, September 9, 2024. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2024/09/08/politics/afghanistan-withdrawal-house-reports-mccaul-meeks.

12. Azi Paybarah, et al., “Republicans flood TV with misleading ads about immigration, border,” Washington Post, August 18, 2024. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/elections/interactive/2024/republican-campaign-ads-immigration-border-security/.

13. Eugene Daniels and Elena Schneider, “Harris promises to go tough on border security,” Politico, August 9, 2024. Retrieved from https://www.politico.com/news/2024/08/09/harris-promises-to-go-tough-on-border-security-00173485.

14. Hannah Hartig and Carroll Doherty, “Two Decades Later, the Enduring Legacy of 9/11,” Pew Research Center, September 2, 2021. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/09/02/two-decades-later-the-enduring-legacy-of-9-11/.

15. The Associated Press, “A look at the protests of the war in Gaza that have emerged at US colleges,” AP News, April 30, 2024. Retrieved from https://apnews.com/article/gaza-war-campus-protests-966eb531279f8e4381883fc5d79d5466; “Rights expert finds ‘reasonable grounds’ genocide is being committed in Gaza,” United Nations, March 26, 2024. Retrieved from https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/03/1147976; “Genocide in Gaza,” University Network for Human Rights, May 15, 2024. Retrieved from https://www.humanrightsnetwork.org/genocide-in-gaza.

16. Laura Silver, “Younger Americans stand out in their views of the Israel-Hamas war,” Pew Research Center, April 2, 2024. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/04/02/younger-americans-stand-out-in-their-views-of-the-israel-hamas-war/

17. Edith M. Lederer, “Trump says he can end the Russia-Ukraine war in one day. Russia’s UN ambassador says he can’t,” AP News, July 2, 2024. Retrieved from https://apnews.com/article/trump-russia-ukraine-war-un-election-a78ecb843af452b8dda1d52d137ca893.

18. Dewey Sim, “Beijing ‘wary’ as Japan deepens defence ties with Vietnam, Philippines,” South China Morning Post, August 11, 2024. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3273893/south-china-sea-beijing-wary-japan-deepens-defence-ties-vietnam-philippines.

19. Mia McCarthy, “Vance warns of China’s influence during Michigan rally,” Politico, August 27, 2024. Retrieved from https://www.politico.com/news/2024/08/27/jd-vance-michigan-rally-battleground-china-00176522.

20. Alina Selyukh, “America can’t resist fast fashion. Shein, with all its issues, is tailored for it,” NPR, October 13, 2023. Retrieved from https://www.npr.org/2023/10/13/1204983212/shein-america-fast-fashion-legal-issues.

21. Colleen McClain, “A declining share of adults, and few teens, support a US TikTok ban,” Pew Research Center, December 11, 2023. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/12/11/a-declining-share-of-adults-and-few-teens-support-a-us-tiktok-ban/.

22. Lindsay Maizland, “Why China-Taiwan Relations Are So Tense,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 8, 2024. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-biden#chapter-title-0-2.

23. Dina Smeltz and Craig Kafura, “For First Time, Half of Americans Favor Defending Taiwan If China Invades,” Chicago Council on Global Affairs, August 2021. Retrieved from https://globalaffairs.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/2021%20Taiwan%20Brief.pdf.

24. Mohamad Moslimani and Jeffrey S. Passel, “What the data says about immigrants in the US,” Pew Research Center, July 22, 2024. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/07/22/key-findings-about-us-immigrants/.

25. Scott Wong and Kate Santaliz, “Lawmakers press Biden to get Congress’ approval for Middle East airstrikes,” NBC News, January 29, 2024. Retrieved from https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/lawmakers-press-biden-get-congress-approval-middle-east-airstrikes-rcna136206.

26. Mary Clare Jalonick, “Senate votes to keep 2001 authorization for war on terror,” AP News, March 22, 2023. Retrieved from https://apnews.com/article/senate-vote-war-powers-iraq-afghanistan-a174a1b97644f2f64994f13b1ff41a20.

27. Walter Russell Mead, “Chapter 3: Changing the Paradigms,” in Special Providence, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2002).

28. Worldviews assigned to the four types in Walter Russell Mead’s typology were determined by a composite of three separate questions, the four answers to which correspond to each of the four types. Two of the three questions were reviewed—and the third question was supplied—by Professor Mead in 2019. The Mead worldview types were assigned to respondents who answered at least two of the three questions in a consistent way. The questions were: “The most important obligation of the American government is__;” “In the 21st century, the greatest threat America will face is__;” and “Peace is best achieved and sustained by the United States by__.”

29. Walter Russell Mead, “The Return of Hamiltonian Statecraft,” Foreign Affairs, August 20, 2024. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/return-hamiltonian-statecraft-walter-mead.

30. Walter Russell Mead, “Chapter 6: Vindicator Only of Her Own,” in Special Providence, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2002), 214-17.

31. “Inflection Point,” Institute for Global Affairs, September, 2021, 10-11. Retrieved from https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/2021-09-Inflection-Point.pdf.

32. Walter Russell Mead, “America’s Jacksonian Turn,” Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2024. Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/americas-jacksonian-turn-presidential-election-history-9e684333.

33. Robert C. O’Brien, “The Return of Peace Through Strength,” Foreign Affairs, June 18, 2024. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/return-peace-strength-trump-obrien; Christopher Miller, “Department of Defense,” in Mandate for Leadership 2025: The Conservative Promise, edited by Paul Dans and Steve Grove, (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2023).

34. Andrew Payne, “Kamala Harris has a different view on Gaza to Joe Biden – it could win her votes in November,” The Conversation, July 24, 2024. Retrieved from https://theconversation.com/kamala-harris-has-a-different-view-on-gaza-to-joe-biden-it-could-win-her-votes-in-november-235384; Mark Hannah and Rachel Rizzo, “Harris and Walz Can Remake US Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy, August 7, 2024. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/07/harris-walz-us-election-progressive-foreign-policy-war-israel-gaza-ukraine/.

35. Stephen M. Walt, “The Myth of American Exceptionalism,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/the-myth-of-american-exceptionalism/.

36. Gen Z is increasingly worried about money, in “2023 EY Gen Z Segmentation Study,” Ernst & Young, September, 2023. Retrieved from https://www.ey.com/content/dam/ey-unified-site/ey-com/en-us/campaigns/consulting/documents/ey-2307-4309403-genz-segmentation-report-us-score-no-20902-231us-2-vf4.pdf.

37. According to data collected during this year’s survey, 16% of respondents between 18-29 years old selected economic prosperity. 

38. Peter Eisler, Ned Parker, and Joseph Tanfani, “Trump blasts his trial judges. Then his fans call for violence,” Reuters, May 14, 2024. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-election-threats-courts/; Phil Stewart, Idrees Ali, and Steve Holland, “How Trump fell out of love with his generals, and why the feeling is mutual,” Reuters, September 23, 2020. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/world/how-trump-fell-out-of-love-with-his-generals-and-why-the-feeling-is-mutual-idUSKCN26E2YY/; Bill Barrow and Meg Kinnard, “Trump again tears into Georgia’s Republican governor on the same day he campaigns in the state,” AP News, August 3, 2024. Retrieved from https://apnews.com/article/trump-vance-atlanta-georgia-harris-rally-b21c25bbbfafdd0343c8812f6c3d7c9e.

39. Robbie Gramer, Dan De Luce, and Colum Lynch, “How the Trump Administration Broke the State Department,” Foreign Policy, July 31, 2017. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/31/how-the-trump-administration-broke-the-state-department/;  Stephen Fowler, “Trump says he wouldn’t defend NATO allies from Russia if they’re ‘delinquent,’” NPR, February 11, 2024. Retrieved from https://www.npr.org/2024/02/11/1230658309/trump-would-encourage-russia-to-attack-nato-allies-who-dont-pay-bills.

 40. “Trump’s Foreign-Policy Influencers,” Foreign Policy, August 26, 2024. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/26/trump-foreign-policy-influencers-us-election-china-trade-nato-ukraine/.

41. Jo Inge Bekkevold, “NATO’s Remarkable Revival,” Foreign Policy, September 11, 2023. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/11/nato-alliance-us-europe-russia-geopolitics-china-military-deterrence/.

42.  White House, Briefing Room, Remarks by President Biden and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in Madrid, Spain, June 29, 2024. Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/06/29/remarks-by-president-biden-and-nato-secretary-general-jens-stoltenberg-madrid-spain/.

43. Christopher S. Chivvis, “NATO Is Turning 75, but How Much Is There to Celebrate?,” Foreign Policy, July 1, 2024. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/07/01/nato-turns-75-history-future-challenges/.

44. Liana Fix and Caroline Kapp, “As NATO Countries Reach Spending Milestone, Is 2 Percent Enough?,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 28, 2024. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/nato-countries-reach-spending-milestone-2-percent-enough. 

45. These results are shown in this report, on page 11.

46. This is according to data collected in this survey which is not shown in the infographic.

47. See above. The answer to the question ”Do you think the US should continue pursuing negotiations to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon in the near future?” was used as the Independent variable.

48. See above. The answer to the question ”Should the NATO member countries, including the US, push for a negotiated settlement for the war in Ukraine?” was used as the Independent variable.

49. This is according to data collected in this survey which is not shown in the infographic.

50. Fatima Hussein, Andrea Rodriguez, and Rebecca Santana, “US opens up banking to private Cuban businesses as it aims to boost private sector,” AP News, May 28, 2024. Retrieved from https://apnews.com/article/cuba-state-department-treasury-business-terrorism-9e2e582dfd93b02f1a9de3a563d65b28.

51. This is according to data collected in this survey which is not shown in the infographic.

52. See above.

53. See above. The answer to the question ”Should the US send troops to Finland to fight Russia?” was used as the Independent variable.

54. Nan Tian, et al., “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2023,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, April, 2024. Retrieved from https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/2404_fs_milex_2023.pdf.